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Chapter 1
Damages in Lieu of Performance Because of
Breach of Contract
I.

INTRODUCTION

In contract disputes between transnational contracting parties, damages are often awarded
to compensate a claimant for loss, injury or detriment resulting from a respondent’s failure to
perform the agreement. In fact, damages may be the principal means of substituting for
performance or they may complement other remedies, such as rescission or specific
performance.
Damages for breach of contract typically serve to protect one of three interests of a
claimant: (1) performance interest (also known as expectation interest); (2) reliance interest; or
(3) restitution interest. The primary goal of damages in most jurisdictions is to fulfill a
claimant’s performance interest by giving the claimant the substitute remedy of the “benefit of
the bargain” monetarily. This typically includes compensation for actual loss incurred as a result
of the breach and for net gains, including lost profits, that the claimant was precluded from
realizing because of the respondent’s actions.
All legal systems place limitations on damage awards. The most common limitations are
causation, foreseeability, certainty, fault, and avoidability. In order to obtain damages, there
must be a causal connection between the respondent’s breach and the claimant’s loss. In

1

addition, the claimant must show that the loss was foreseeable or not too remote. Further, the
claimant is required to show with reasonable certainty the amount of the damage. Many civil
law countries also require, as a prerequisite to an award of damages for breach of contract, that
the respondent be at fault in breaching the agreement. Damages may also be limited by the
doctrine of avoidability, which provides that damages which could have been avoided without
undue risk, burden, or humiliation are not recoverable.
It also should be noted at the outset that parties may agree upon the remedies available
for breach of contract.1 For example, they may limit the scope of liability in the event that a
party terminates the contract because of certain events. In addition, they may include a
liquidated damages provision, which provides for a specified amount of damages to be paid by a
party who repudiates the agreement. However, some jurisdictions may refuse to enforce such a
clause, particularly if the amount to be paid in liquidated damages is grossly disproportionate to
the actual loss or loss that could reasonably arise under the circumstances.2
The rules concerning damages for breach of contract are complex and vary greatly from
country to country. Furthermore, in some federal countries, such as the United States and
Canada, the applicable rules differ among states and provinces. This study thus surveys only the
general rules concerning damages awarded in lieu of performance because of a breach of
contract (“performance damages”).3 It begins with an overview of the purposes served by
awarding damages. It then examines performance damages for breach of contract in common
law and civil law countries. The study subsequently analyzes the awarding of damages under the
Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG), which applies to “a sales contract
between a buyer and seller, each of which has its place of business in different countries that are
a party to the Convention, unless the buyer and seller provide otherwise.”4 Finally, the study
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discusses the awarding of damages under general principles of law and principles of equity and
fairness.
II.

OVERVIEW OF THE PURPOSES OF DAMAGES

Damages for breach of contract in civil and common law jurisdictions have a common
source, the Roman law principle casum sentit dominus – that each person bears his or her own
accidental damages.5 In addition, in most civil and common law jurisdictions, damages are
designed to protect one or more of the following three interests: performance, reliance and
restitution.
Performance Interest. The usual goal of damages is to put the claimant in the position
that it would have been in had the contract been performed; that is, to give the claimant the
“benefit of the bargain.”6 This is known as performance or expectation interest.7 Damages for
performance interest may involve claims for three types of loss: direct loss, incidental loss, and
consequential loss. Direct loss is the loss in value to the claimant that results from the failure of
the respondent to perform its contractual obligations. It is typically measured by the market
value of the benefit of which the claimant has been deprived through the breach, or the costs of
reasonable measures to bring about the situation that would have existed had the contract been
properly performed. In some circumstances, a breach of contract may cause a claimant to incur
additional costs in an attempt to avoid further loss. These expenses are referred to as incidental
loss. For example, in the case of a breach by a seller, incidental damages may include the costs
incurred in preserving or storing goods that have been delivered late, or goods that are defective
and are to be returned to the seller. A breach of contract may not only cause a claimant to suffer
direct and incidental losses, but it may also cause a claimant to suffer losses from dealing with
third parties, which is called consequential loss. For example, in the case of a breach by a buyer,
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a seller may suffer consequential damages resulting from the termination of contracts with
suppliers, or fees resulting from a dishonored check. The circumstances under which claimants
may recover damages for direct, incidental and consequential loss vary among jurisdictions.
Reliance Interest. Reliance interest attempts to put the claimant in the position the
claimant would have been in had the contract never been made.8 There are two types of reliance
interest: essential reliance and incidental reliance.9 Essential reliance allows recovery for
preparation and performance under the agreement, while incidental reliance allows recovery for
preparations for collateral transactions that were to occur when the contract at issue was to have
been performed. However, reliance interest generally does not include lost opportunities to
make other contracts. Unlike performance interest, the burden may be placed on the respondent
to prove that the claimant’s expenses would have been incurred even if the contract had not been
breached.
Restitution Interest. The object of restitution interest is to return or to restore to the
claimant the gain or benefit that the respondent received as a result of the breach of the contract.
Basically, it prevents unjust enrichment of the respondent. Thus, the focus is not upon the
claimant, but upon the breaching party. Restitution interest requires the respondent to turn over
to the claimant any benefit that the respondent received because of the respondent’s failure to
perform the contract. Damages for restitution interest are typically smaller than for performance
interest or reliance interest because restitution interest does not include the claimant’s lost profit
or expenditures made in reliance on the contract that did not confer a benefit on the respondent.
Restitution may be an appropriate remedy for breach of an unenforceable contract.10
The following example illustrates recovery of damages under the various interests.
Suppose a company from country A (the claimant) enters into a contract to build a water bottling
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plant with a company in country B (the respondent) for US$10 million. Assume that it will cost
the claimant US$8 million to build the facility, thus earning a US$2 million profit. Also assume
that, immediately after the contract is executed and before the claimant has spent any resources
on the project, the respondent intentionally repudiates the agreement. In this circumstance, the
claimant’s performance interest is US$2 million, which is the amount needed to put the claimant
in the position it would have been in had the contract been performed. The reliance interest is
US$0 because the claimant has incurred no expenses in reliance prior to the repudiation of the
agreement. Similarly, the restitution interest is US$0 because the respondent has not been
unjustly enriched. Assume instead that the respondent does not repudiate the agreement until
after the claimant has spent US$5 million on the project and the facility, in its unfinished state, is
now worth US$1 million (at the time of breach). The claimant’s performance interest is now
US$7 million11 because this is the sum needed to give the claimant the benefit of the bargain. By
contrast, the claimant’s reliance interest is US$5 million and the restitution interest is US$1
million.
III. SURVEY OF NATIONAL LAWS
A.

Europe
1.

Common Law System

In England, an award of damages is the usual remedy for breach of contract.12 The
purpose of such damages is not to punish the respondent, but rather to place the party who has
sustained a loss, in so far as money can do it, in the same situation as if the contract had been
performed.13 That is, damages are compensatory, commonly awarded to protect a claimant’s
performance interest.14
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Common law systems classify damages for breach of contract into three types: nominal,
general and special. Nominal damages may be awarded when the respondent is liable for a
breach of contract, but the claimant is unable to prove any actual damages.15 General damages
are those that result from the infringement of a legal right or duty. They are characterized as the
natural and probable consequences of the particular breach and include both pecuniary and nonpecuniary losses.16 Special damages, on the other hand, are pecuniary losses precisely
quantifiable at the date of the trial, such as expenses, loss of earnings and loss of profits. Special
damages arise out of special and extraordinary circumstances.17
English courts have drawn a number of other distinctions between general and special
damages. Special damages must be specifically pleaded and proved in order to be awarded.18
By contrast, general damages are recoverable without proof of loss19 so that it need only be
“averred that such damage has been suffered.”20 Special damages, unlike general damages, also
cannot be claimed in contract suits, “unless such damages were within the contemplation of both
parties at the time of the contract.”21
Damages for mental distress are typically not awarded in breach of contract actions,
unless such damages were within the contemplation of the parties at the time they entered into
the contract.22 For example, damages for mental distress may be recovered if the object of the
contract was to provide peace of mind or freedom from distress.23
Damages for breach of contract to pay money are normally limited to the amount of the
debt together with such interest from the time when it became due.24 Similarly, the cost of
raising the money elsewhere may be recoverable as a natural result of a breach of contract to
lend money.25 In addition, whether a contract is to pay or lend money, where the circumstances
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are such that a special loss is foreseeable at the time of the making of a contract, damages may be
recoverable for that loss.26
Sale of Goods. The law governing remedies for breach of contract involving the sale of
goods is codified in the English Sale of Goods Act of 1979. The Act divides the remedies
available depending on whether the claimant is a seller or buyer. Under the Act, a seller has an
action for the contract price where the buyer has failed to pay for goods after taking delivery or
after a specified day.27 In addition, a seller has a right to damages where the buyer has wrongly
refused to take delivery of goods.28 The measure of damages “is the estimated loss directly and
naturally resulting, in the ordinary course of events.”29 A market is typically available in the sale
of goods. In that case, a seller’s damages are measured by the difference between the contract
price and market price at the time at which delivery should have taken place.30 In a falling
market, which might possibly encourage a buyer to breach, a seller may be forced to resell the
goods at a price lower than the contract price. By allowing the seller to recover the difference
between the contract and market price, the Act theoretically places the seller in the same position
the seller would have been in had the contract been performed.
In the case of a seller’s breach of contract, a buyer’s damages are measured the same way
as the seller’s damages. The buyer is compensated for any losses it suffered which were the
direct and natural result of the seller’s breach.31 When there is a market available for the goods,
damages are assumed to be equal to the difference between the contract price and the market
price at the time delivery should have been made.32 This enables buyers to receive the “benefit
of the bargain” and, if forced to purchase more expensive goods on the market, the buyer can
recover the difference between the more expensive goods and the goods for which it contracted.
In cases where the seller breached the contract under a breach of warranty, the buyer may

7

maintain an action for damages.33 Damages are generally measured by the difference in value
between the defective goods and the contracted for goods.34 This essentially compensates buyers
for any gain of which they have been deprived by receiving inferior goods.
Buyers of goods are often involved in contracts with third parties for the resale of the
goods, presumably at a profit. This raises the issue of whether those lost profits are recoverable
as damages.35
Requirements and Limitations. Common law jurisdictions impose several requirements
and limitations on damages for breach of contract. These include: (a) a claimant may only
recover loss that was directly caused by the respondent; (b) a claimant may only recover for loss
that was foreseeable as a probable result of the breach of contract; (c) a claimant may not recover
for loss that could have been avoided; and (d) a claimant may only recover for loss that can be
proved with reasonable certainty.36
Causation/Foreseeability. In most common law jurisdictions, in order to receive
damages for breach of contract a causal connection must exist between the claimant’s loss and
the respondent’s breach of contract.37 Thus, the issue becomes whether the respondent’s breach
was so connected with the claimant’s loss or damage that “as a matter of ordinary common sense
and experience it should be regarded as the cause of it.”38 Typically, the claimant is required to
show that, if the respondent had not breached the contract, the claimant could have performed its
obligations under the agreement.
If the breach of contract is one of two causes, both co-operating and both of equal
efficacy, sufficient causation exists. However, causation may be negated by “the voluntary act
of a third person intervening between the breach of the contract by the [respondent] and the loss
suffered by the [claimant].”39
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Even if the claimant is able to show that the respondent’s breach of contract caused the
claimant’s loss, the claimant must still show that the damage is not too remote. In general,
common law jurisdictions limit the recovery of damages to losses which were within the
contemplation of the parties when the contract was made or foreseeable as a probable result of
the breach. This concept of foreseeability originates from the Court of Exchequer’s landmark
decision in Hadley v. Baxendale.40
In Hadley, a miller contracted with carriers to deliver a broken shaft to a manufacturer for
repair. The carriers failed to deliver the shaft to the manufacturer by the time to which they had
agreed. This resulted in the miller having to delay the reopening of the mill. The miller then
sued the carriers for the profits he would have made had the mill been able to resume operations
without the delay. The court held that the loss of profits was not recoverable because the facts
known to the carrier were not sufficient to “show reasonably that the profits of the mill must be
stopped by an unreasonable delay in the delivery of the broken shaft by the carriers to the third
person.”41 The court explained:
We think the proper rule in such a case as the present is this: where two parties
have made a contract which one of them has broken, the damages which the other
party ought to receive in respect of such breach of contract should be such as may
fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally, i.e. according to the
usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or such as may
reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the
time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it. Now, if the
special circumstances under which the contract was actually made were
communicated by the plaintiffs to the defendants, and thus known to both parties,

9

the damages resulting from the breach of such a contract, which they would
reasonably contemplate, would be the amount of injury which would ordinarily
follow from a breach of contract under these special circumstances so known and
communicated. But, on the other hand, if these special circumstances were
wholly unknown to the party breaking the contract, he, at the most, could only be
supposed to have had in his contemplation the amount of injury which would
arise generally, and in the great multitude of cases not affected by any special
circumstances, from such a breach of contract. For, had the special circumstances
been known, the parties might have specially provided for the breach of contract
by special terms as to the damages in that case; and of this advantage it would be
very unjust to deprive them. Now the above principles are those by which we
think the jury ought to be guided in estimating the damages arising out of any
breach of contract.42
There are thus two main principles of Hadley. First, a loss is recoverable if it can be said
to flow naturally from certain breaches of contract.43 Second, if a loss does not flow naturally
from the breach, it must be shown that the respondent possessed such knowledge that would
enable an ordinary person, at the time of entering into the contract, to foresee that extraordinary
loss would ensue from a breach of contract.44 The main significance of these rules is to limit the
availability of recovery of compensation for anticipated profits and consequential damages.45
This test of foreseeability covers both general and special damages. This determination is
evaluated in light of the special knowledge that the respondent possessed (actual knowledge) as
well as any knowledge it should have possessed (imputed knowledge). Thus, both an objective
(reasonable person) and a subjective (in light of the facts known) standard is applied. In
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addition, the ability of a breaching party to foresee damages is evaluated at the time the contract
was made.46
In England, a slightly different limitation of foreseeability applies with regard to the sale
of goods. Section 50(2) of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893 provides: “[t]he measure of damages is
the estimated loss directly and naturally resulting, in the ordinary course of events, from the
buyer’s breach of contract.”47
Certainty. Damages must also be proven with reasonable certainty.48 The certainty rule
applies only to the fact of damages, not to the amount of damages.49 Thus, if the claimant
provides sufficient evidence of loss or damage, the fact that the amount of damages is difficult to
assess is generally no bar to recovery.50 Damages can be uncertain for a variety of reasons.
There can be uncertainty as to how to measure the loss.51 Or, it can be uncertain that a loss will
occur from a breach of contract, such as the loss of profits due to a breach of contract.
Accordingly, courts in common law countries have been willing to award damages for lost
profits and the loss of a chance.52
The classic example of a court awarding damages for loss of chance is Chaplin v.
Hicks.53 In Chaplin, a woman was denied the opportunity to compete in a beauty contest with
fifty other contestants for the chance to win one of twelve acting contracts. The organizer of the
contest unsuccessfully argued that the woman’s loss of chance was incapable of assessment.
Instead, the court held for the beauty contestant and denied that “the mere fact that it is
impossible to assess the damages with precision and certainty relieves a wrongdoer from paying
any damages in respect of the breach of a duty of which he has been guilty.”54 The court ruled
that the beauty contestant’s chance of winning was something to which a monetary value could
be assigned. The court reasoned that if the beauty contestant had tried to sell her position as one
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of the fifty beauty contestants in the running for twelve possible acting contracts, an individual
could have bought it from her for a fixed price. With respect to damages, the court let stand the
jury’s decision to award the beauty contestant 100 pounds. In doing so, it noted that the beauty
contestant, as one of fifty contestants competing for twelve prizes, was entitled to damages equal
to roughly one quarter of the potential prize money.55
Avoidability. In England, a claimant may be precluded from recovering damages for loss
that the claimant could have avoided through appropriate measures.56 The purpose of this
principle is to preclude wastefulness on the part of the claimant at the expense of the
respondent.57 It is important to point out that this principle does not impose a positive duty on
the claimant. In other words, there is no affirmative “duty to mitigate,” as the failure to mitigate
would not result in liability. Rather, the failure to take the appropriate mitigation measures
precludes the recovery of damages that could have been avoided.58 Typically, the burden is on
the respondent to prove that the claimant failed to take the appropriate mitigation measures.59
Claimants need not “do anything other than in the ordinary course of business,”60 or take steps
that would subject them to “undue risk, burden or humiliation,” including steps that would injure
their commercial reputation.61
What constitutes appropriate mitigation varies depending on the circumstances. In
general, a claimant must “take all reasonable steps to mitigate the loss consequent on the
breach.”62 The duty to mitigate, however, arises only after claimants have accepted the
repudiation by the breaching party.63 In some cases, a claimant need not “mitigate loss, even
after the [respondent’s] performance of the contract which he has repudiated falls due, by
accepting the repudiation and suing for damages.”64 Once claimants accept the breach of
contract they are “debar[red] . . . from claiming any part of the damage which is due to [their]
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neglect to take such steps.”65 In other words, the failure to mitigate results in damages being
calculated as if the claimant did not act reasonably to minimize its loss.66 If the claimant takes
steps to mitigate its loss, the claimant may recover loss or expense incurred in reasonably
attempting to do so, even where the mitigating steps in fact led to greater loss.67
2.

Civil Law Systems

In civil law jurisdictions, the law of contracts is codified in the law of obligations (the
civil code) or in the commercial code.68 However, it is important to point out at the outset that,
in contrast to common law countries, specific performance is at least in theory a preferred
remedy in civil law systems.69 In the new German Statute on Modernisation of the Law of
Obligations, damages may be sought only if certain conditions are met.70 In other systems, such
as France, courts have discretionary power over the appropriate remedy and may order the
payment of damages instead of specific performance, even where the latter is possible, especially
if the claimant prefers damages.71
Civil law systems base an award of damages on two Roman law concepts of
compensation.72 The first is known as damnum emergens, which is compensation for actual
losses suffered. For example, where a contract to build a house is breached, the
contractor/claimant may seek to recover damages for the value of the wood that it purchased
from a lumber yard. The second concept is known as lucrum cessans, which is net gains
prevented. This concept relates to the expectation of putting the bargained for performance to
good use. For instance, in the above example, the claimant may also claim damages for the
profit it would have made from building the house. Damnum emergens and lucrum cessans are
sometimes described as being equivalent to reliance and performance interest measures.
However, such a characterization can be misleading. Lucrum cessans is necessarily a
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performance interest loss. Conversely, damnum emergens may be either a reliance or
performance interest loss.73 For instance, in a contract for the sale of goods, the damnum
emergens may be measured by the difference between the contract price and the market price,
which also represents the performance interest.74 In any event, the distinction between reliance
and performance interest typically is only useful in common law; in France, at least, such a
distinction is not made.75
Some civil law jurisdictions classify damages for breach of contract into two categories
called positive interest and negative interest.76 The purpose of positive interest is to place the
claimant in the financial position it would have been in had the contract been performed. This
amount may include any profits it would have received if the breach had not occurred. By
contrast, the purpose of negative interest is to restore the claimant to the position it would have
been in had the transaction not taken place. That is, it furthers the claimant’s reliance interest.77
Some civil law countries also allow non-pecuniary damage to be claimed, which is
known as moral damage.78 Moral damages are damages occurring from “intangible injury to
feelings, honor, or moral principles, causing pain or suffering.”79 In France, for example, a court
awarded an actress damages for harm to her reputation after a theater failed to put her name in
letters of the agreed size.80 Other countries, such as Germany, do not usually allow recovery for
moral damage.81
In general, damages “constitute a substitute for performance, that is, full compensation
for the loss resulting from the breach of contract.”82 Thus, many civil codes provide that a
claimant may recover for the loss incurred (damnum emergens) and for the gain of which it was
deprived (lucrum cessans).83 This awards claimants the “benefit of the bargain,” essentially
awarding claimants their performance interest.84 The goal is the same as in common law, to put
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claimants in the position they expected to be in had the contract been performed. Depending on
the jurisdiction, it is often important under civil law to characterize various breaches of contract.
While French law treats breaches the same way common law does, by comprehensively grouping
them together, other countries categorize the various types of breach.85 In Austria, breaches of
contract are categorized into impossibility, delay, breach of warranty and positive violation. The
available remedies depend on the type of breach.86 For example, in the case of delayed
performance, where performance is late but still possible, damages are available when the delay
is due to the obligor’s fault.87
Not every breach of contract enables the injured party to rescind the contract. The breach
must be material. Each country approaches this requirement differently. In Italy, rescission will
not be granted if the breach has only “slight importance” to the other party’s interest.88 In
France, courts have wide discretion in granting a rescission of a contract and damages (known as
a résolution of a contract) by looking at the level of the breach and whether or not damages
would be adequate.89 German law provides separate standards for the right to terminate, but
generally requires a serious breach.90 In Switzerland, a party can terminate a contract if the
obligor failed to perform after having been given an additional time for performance.91
In contracts which involve the payment of a sum of money, damages are often expressly
spelled out in civil codes as limited to the sum and interest.92 There is also no requirement that
the claimant show proof of loss.93
Sale of Goods. In sale of goods cases in civil law countries, like in common law
countries, different methods exist for determining the value of a claimant’s damages. The first is
the “concrete” method,94 where damages equal the difference between the contract price and the
price the buyer paid in a substitute contract.95 The second is the “abstract” method, where no
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substitute transaction has taken place and damages equal the difference between the contract
price and the market price at the time substitute goods could have been obtained. In the case of
breach by buyers, “concrete” refers to the actual resale price, and “abstract” refers to the market
price.96 It is worth noting that, in France, the injured party to a sale must obtain a court order
before it can go into the market for substitute goods.97
Where goods have been delivered but are defective, civil law countries allow the buyer to
reduce the price of the contract, the actio quanti minoris.98 For example in Germany, if goods
are defective, a buyer has the right to terminate the contract, demand compensation, or demand
“reimbursement for wasted expenditures.”99
Some civil law countries have sale of goods acts similar to common law countries’ acts
and codes governing the sale of goods, like the English Sale of Goods Act of 1979.100 These acts
prescribe remedies in the event a breach of a contract for the sale of goods occurs. Moreover,
they divide remedies for a breach of contract into buyers’ remedies in the event of a breach by a
seller and sellers’ remedies in the event of a breach by a buyer. For example, in the event of a
breach by a seller under both Finland’s and Norway’s Sale of Goods Acts, a buyer is entitled to a
reduction in price (if a seller delivers defective goods), or specific performance or monetary
damages (if a seller fails to deliver a buyer’s goods), or both.101 Likewise, in the event of a
breach by a buyer, a seller is entitled to specific performance or monetary damages. Damages
may consist of direct loss or indirect loss (which includes lost profits). Moreover, in the event a
breach of a sales contract occurs and a buyer replaces goods unjustifiably not delivered or a
seller resells unjustifiably rejected goods, damages are calculated as the difference between the
contract price and the price of the substitute transaction. If a breach of contract occurs but a
buyer does not procure substitute goods or a seller does not resell rejected goods, damages are
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calculated as the difference between the contract price and the current price of the goods at the
time and place of cancellation where the goods were to be delivered.102 Also, a number of
countries in Europe, such as Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands,
Sweden and Switzerland, have adopted the U.N. Convention on the International Sale of Goods
(CISG).103
Requirements and Limitations. In order to recover either damnum emergens or lucrum
cessans, or both types of damages, the claimant usually must satisfy several requirements,
including causation, fault and certainty. In general, the claimant bears the burden of proof with
respect to these issues.104 Some jurisdictions also require that the claimant notify the respondent
of its failure to fulfill its contractual obligations. In addition, many preclude recovery for
damages that the claimant could have avoided. Furthermore, the requirements for the recovery
of lost profits in civil law countries vary from country to country and, as a general rule, damages
are more difficult to obtain than in common law countries.
Causation/Foreseeability. Like common law countries, many civil law countries require
some form of causation before liability attaches. In general, under the French model, causation
is employed under the concept of foreseeability.105 Under French law, a respondent is liable only
for damages “which were foreseen or which could have been foreseen at the time of the
contract,” except in cases of a willful breach.106 The foreseeability requirement, which applies to
both the type of damages and to the amount of damages, has the effect of limiting damages,
especially for lost profits. In addition to the requirement that damages be foreseeable, French
law also requires that damages be the direct result of the breach.107
As noted, the foreseeability requirement does not apply in cases of a willful breach (dol)
or, in some jurisdictions, a breach resulting from gross negligence.108 In the case of a willful
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breach (or one made with gross negligence), the respondent is typically liable for both damnum
emergens and lucrum cessans, as long as they are an immediate and direct result of the breach.109
By contrast, German law does not recognize the concept of foreseeability.110
Nevertheless, German law still limits damages through the concept of adequate causation. The
test for whether adequate causation exists has been expressed as whether “the obligor’s default,
as judged by ordinary human standards at the time of its occurrence, render, more likely,
damages of the kind actually suffered.”111 Under Austrian law, adequate causation exists if “the
damage was not totally unforeseeable in the normal course of events.”112
Certainty. In general, damages must be certain in their existence, but not in their
amount.113 Countries following this rule allow recovery for future damages as long as the
damages are certain to occur in the future.114 The loss of chance also may constitute
compensable damages if the circumstances show that the chance was certain.115 The requirement
that a claimant prove damages to a reasonable degree of certainty is sometimes treated as part of
substantive law and is found in the civil code of a country, as it is in Italy.116 In other countries,
such as Germany and Switzerland, however, the requirement of certainty is treated as a
procedural requirement.117
Fault. An often commented on distinction between common law and civil law is that in
civil law there is generally no liability for damages unless the respondent was “at fault” in
breaching the agreement.118 This could be satisfied by a willful breach or a breach resulting
from negligence.119 In some countries, such as Germany and Austria, the burden is on the
breaching party to prove the lack of fault.120 By contrast, in France, Belgium, Spain, and Italy
the law places the burden to prove fault on the claimant.121 Under Austrian law, lost profits are
not recoverable for breach of contract unless the breach was caused intentionally or with gross
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negligence,122 or the respondent is a merchant who caused the damage during the course of
business.123
Notice. In many civil law countries, liability for breach of contract does not attach to
non-performing parties until they have been put in default.124 Once a non-performing party is
placed in default, damages begin to run against it.125 Putting the respondent in default is
accomplished by providing notice, mise en demeure, to the respondent that performance,
damages, or rescission of the contract is being demanded.126 The purpose of mise en demeure is
for the claimant to assert a demand for performance, because failure to do so results in an
assumption that the claimant has acquiesced to the respondent’s delayed performance.127 The
mise en demeure is not required in certain instances, typically where performance must be within
a set time,128 or where agreed to by the parties.129
In Germany, in order for a claim for damages to arise, the respondent must fail to perform
and the claimant must not only make a demand for performance, but must also fix an additional
time for performance.130 Once the respondent is put in default and has been given additional
time to perform, it becomes liable for damages. This concept of providing a party who has failed
to perform with additional time is known as Nachfrist.131
Avoidability. There is no uniform approach to the reduction of damages due to the failure
of claimants to use reasonable efforts to mitigate their losses. The rules in civil law countries,
however, often achieve the same result by refusing to award damages if a claimant’s losses were
caused by the claimant’s reckless attitude, or by reducing damages in accordance with the extent
of the claimant’s fault.132 Under Swiss law, a judge may reduce the amount of damages for
reasons “which he [the injured party] is responsible for having caused or aggravated. . . .”133 In
France, it is accepted that the claimant “should not be allowed to increase damages for losses
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which were avoidable.”134 In Dutch law, an innocent party is under an obligation to reduce the
damage caused by the breach of contract. For instance, if a claimant acted negligently in not
reducing its damages, the court will reduce the claimant’s award of damages accordingly.135
When a claimant undertakes efforts to avoid loss, the expenses incurred in doing so are usually
recoverable as reasonable costs of mitigation.136 In contracts for the sale of goods, for instance,
there may be a duty to mitigate loss by going into the market and obtaining substitute goods.137
The ICC Tribunal’s decision in Final Award in Case No. 8423 of 1994 illustrates the
application of the causation requirement in a transnational dispute and the awarding of lost
profits.138 There, two Portuguese companies (the claimants) entered into an association
agreement with a subsidiary of a French company, the purpose of which was the exploitation of
certain plants through a jointly owned company (the “Joint Company”). The agreement also
contained a non-competition clause. The claimants then claimed that the French parent company
(the respondent) breached the non-competition agreement by submitting offers for the
construction and exploitation of four separate projects in which the Joint Company was also
interested. The tribunal noted that, under applicable “Portuguese law (Art. 798 Civil Code),
contractual liability presupposes a wrongful failure to perform an obligation, a damage and a
causal relationship between the wrongful failure to perform and damage.”139 It ruled that, while
the French parent company violated the non-competition clause, there was no causation between
the Joint Company’s claimed damage and the French parent company’s wrongful participation in
the first three projects. The Joint Company did not submit bids to participate in those projects
and failed to prove it had the ability to do so or would have done so. Because it failed to submit
bids in the first three projects, the tribunal held that the Joint Company’s alleged lost profits from
those projects would have occurred even if the French parent company had not breached its
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obligations. However, with respect to the fourth project, the tribunal ruled that adequate
causation existed because the Joint Company did submit an offer for that project, and while the
Tribunal noted that it could not “affirm with certainty that [the Joint Company] would have
obtained the contract if the defendant French parent company had not submitted an offer[,]” the
French parent company’s action “was such as to diminish, according to the ordinary course of
things and general business experience, the chance of success of the submission by the [Joint
Company].”140 Turning to the quantification of damages, the tribunal noted that it was “difficult
to assess [the Joint Company’s] loss of opportunity to the French parent company’s breach of
contract,” in part, because the claimants “failed to submit sufficient evidence of [their lost]
profit.”141 Nevertheless, the Tribunal awarded the claimants as damages what it estimated to be
the claimant’s share of the loss of possible profit, which was set at 12% of the [Joint Company’s]
benefit.142
B.

North America
1.

Canada

The primary purpose of damages in Canada is to protect claimants’ performance interest.
Damages in Canada are designed to place claimants in as good a position as they would have
been in had a breach of contract never occurred.143
Nominal damages are awarded for breach of contract in Canada if the claimant can prove
a respondent breached a contract, but did not suffer any pecuniary loss.144 The amount courts
have awarded for nominal damages differs from decision to decision and has ranged anywhere
from CAN$0.20 to CAN$250.145
In addition, although punitive damages are normally not awarded in breach of contract
disputes, Canadian courts have awarded them in certain instances, such as when the injury
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caused is an independent actionable wrong sufficiently outrageous to warrant exemplary relief.146
Although damages for non-pecuniary loss, such as physical harm, have always been awarded in
Canada if the harm was foreseeable, damages for emotional harm have not typically been
awarded.147 More recently, however, damages for emotional harm have been awarded.148
Sale of Goods. In Canada, contracts for the sale of goods are governed by provincial sale
of goods acts.149 These acts are substantially similar to each other.150
The provincial sale of goods acts in Canada typically provide that damages awarded in a
breach of contract dispute should account for the loss “directly and naturally resulting” from the
breach.151 These damages in sale of goods cases include losses incurred by a lost volume
seller.152 The damages also include all losses incurred by a seller manufacturing specially
manufactured items.153
Where the buyer wrongfully refuses to accept a seller’s goods, the measure of damages is
ascertained by calculating the difference between the contract price and the market price.154
Likewise, where the seller wrongfully refuses to deliver contracted-for goods, the buyer may
maintain an action against the seller for the difference between the contract price and the current
market price of the goods.155 Damages are assessed at “the time or times when the goods ought
to have been accepted, or, if no time is fixed for acceptance, then at the time of the refusal to
accept.”156
Limitations and Requirements. Damages in Canada are restricted by certain limitations
and requirements, amongst them the typical requirements of proof of foreseeability, certainty and
avoidability.
Causation/Foreseeability. Courts in Canada follow the principle from Hadley v.
Baxendale that damages, in order to be recoverable, must have been reasonably foreseeable or in
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the contemplation of the breaching party at the time of the making of the contract.157 In some
cases, Canadian courts have gone even further and required not just that unforeseeable
consequences were in the contemplation of the respondent, but that an agreement was made
between the parties that, in case of breach, the claimant would be compensated for the
unforeseeable consequences.158
Foreseeable loss can include damages that the respondent knew would probably occur but
was not absolutely certain would occur after a breach of contract. It can also include damages
which occur that are of the same type of damage foreseen by the breaching party but not of the
same magnitude.159 Canadian courts, however, are more hesitant to award damages in
circumstances in which the respondent is not acting in its normal capacity, such as when an
individual or company is either pressured into providing or agrees to provide goods in which it
does not normally deal.160
Certainty. In order for damages to be awarded, the claimant must prove that the breach
of contract resulted in loss to the claimant.161 However, as long as damages are proven to have
occurred, the amount of damages does not necessarily need to be specifically proven in order for
the claimant to be awarded damages. Instead, a claimant has the burden of proving its damages
“on a reasonable preponderance of credible evidence.”162
In accordance with the seminal common law case of Chaplin v. Hicks, damages for loss
of chance have also been awarded by Canadian courts, even in cases where the claimant’s chance
was less than fifty percent.163
Avoidability. A claimant may not recover loss that it could have avoided had it acted
reasonably under the circumstances.164 Moreover, a claimant is not excused from mitigating its
losses just because the expenditure of time or money is required in order to mitigate.165
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However, a claimant is not required to take drastic measures to mitigate its losses.166 For
example, a claimant is not required to ruin its reputation in order to mitigate its losses.167
Moreover, a claimant is not forced to accept an offer from the respondent if, by accepting the
offer, the claimant must give up some or all of its legal rights against the defendant.168
The Ontario Court’s decision in Nova Tool & Mold Inc. v. London Industries Inc.169
illustrates the application of the foreseeability and avoidability requirements and the calculation
of damages in a transnational contract dispute. In the case, Nova Tool, a Canadian company, and
London Industries, an American company, entered into a contract in which Nova Tool agreed to
construct molds for London Industries to use in manufacturing automobiles for Honda. Nova
Tool, however, fell extremely behind schedule in its construction of the molds and continually
led London Industries to believe that, despite its delays, the molds would be constructed in
accordance with the parties contracted-upon time line. After almost a year of back and forth
during which time the mold was not completed on schedule and numerous technical flaws in the
molds were discovered, London Industries requested that the mold be moved to its facilities
where it hired outside assistance to attempt to rectify the situation in order to fulfill its own
contracts with Honda. After Nova Tool sued London Industries for supposed non-payments on
the molds, London Industries countersued for damages including lost profits, repair costs and
cost of completion. The Ontario Court ultimately held for London Industries, noting that the
damages suffered by London Industries because of Nova Tool’s failure to prepare the mold on
time and absent defects, were within the reasonable expectation of Nova Tool, even though the
“quantum of [the] (buyer’s) damages . . . may be more than [the] seller anticipated.”170
Additionally, the court held that even though the buyer was under a duty to mitigate its damages,
the buyer in this case (London Industries) did not breach its duty to mitigate by failing to take its
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business elsewhere after Nova Tool was repeatedly late in meeting deadlines, because its
deadline with Honda was so close and the two parties had contracted for molds before during
which Nova Tool had experienced problems during the manufacturing but had always supplied
the molds on time and absent any defects.171
2.

United States

In the United States, as in common law countries generally, damages are the primary
remedy for breach of contract.172 Damages are fundamentally regarded as compensatory and are
only to place innocent parties in the position they would have been in had the contract been
performed.173 In the United States, a claimant has the option of selecting the method for
assessing damages. Thus, a claimant can decide against seeking damages that would protect its
performance interest and instead seek damages that would protect its reliance or restitution
interest. In fact, jurisdictions in the United States have allowed a combination of damages to be
pursued, as long as the award of the damages does not result in double recovery.174
Damages are classified in three separate categories: nominal, general, and special.
Nominal damages are a trivial sum of money awarded when the claimant has not, or cannot,
prove that it suffered any compensable damage. General damages, like general damages in
England, are damages that flow naturally from a breach of contract. Special damages,
synonymous with consequential damages, are damages that do not necessarily flow naturally
from a breach of contract.175
American contract law regards damages for breach of contract as primarily
compensatory. Accordingly, courts typically do not typically award punitive damages in
contract cases. However, punitive damages have been awarded when the breach of contract is
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accompanied by fraudulent conduct or by an independent tort sufficiently outrageous to warrant
such damages.176
Damages for personal injuries are generally recoverable in a breach of contract action.
Damages for mental suffering, however, are typically not recoverable.177 But there are
exceptions to this general rule. Emotional distress damages for breach of contract have been
awarded in cases involving “peculiarly sensitive subject matter, or noncommercial undertakings,
or both.”178 For example, they have been allowed in cases where harassing collection techniques
were used, a burial contract was breached, and a contract for the transportation of a dead body
was breached.179 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides that recovery for mental
suffering or emotional disturbance is allowed where the breach causes bodily harm or the nature
of the contract is such that a breach of it is likely to result in serious emotional disturbance.180
With respect to the calculation of damages, determining the sum of money varies,
depending on the circumstances of the case, including whether the claimant terminated the
contract and whether there was a complete or partial breach.181 The application of these
principles can best be illustrated by looking at some common types of contracts. These include
contracts for the sale of goods.
Sale of Goods. In the United States, all states have adopted some form of the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC), a model law that governs a variety of commercial topics including the
sale of goods under Article Two.182 All states except Louisiana have enacted Article Two of the
UCC, some with minor (but insignificant) alterations.183 Both the 1951 and the revised version
of Article Two of the UCC set forth different remedies for breach of a sales contract, including
damages, depending on whether the claimant is a buyer or a seller and depending on the
circumstances of the breach (e.g., non-delivery or repudiation).184
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Section 2-706, 2-708, 2-709 and 2-710 set forth an aggrieved seller’s pecuniary remedies.
Section 2-706 provides that an aggrieved seller may resell the goods concerned and recover
damages. It states: “Where the resale is made in good faith and in a commercially reasonable
manner the seller may recover the difference between the resale price and the contract price
together with any incidental damages allowed under the provisions of this Article (Section 2710), but less expenses saved in consequence of the buyer's breach.”185
Section 2-708 allows an aggrieved seller to recover damages for non-acceptance. It
states:
(1) Subject to subsection (2) and to the provisions of this Article with respect to
proof of market price (Section 2-723), the measure of damages for nonacceptance or repudiation by the buyer is the difference between the market price
at the time and place for tender and the unpaid contract price together with any
incidental damages provided in this Article (Section 2-710), but less expenses
saved in consequence of the buyer's breach.
(2) If the measure of damages provided in subsection (1) is inadequate to put the
seller in as good a position as performance would have done then the measure of
damages is the profit (including reasonable overhead) which the seller would have
made from full performance by the buyer, together with any incidental damages
provided in this Article (Section 2-710), due allowance for costs reasonably
incurred and due credit for payments or proceeds of resale.186
Section 2-709 provides that when a buyer fails to pay the price, the aggrieved seller may,
in addition to any incidental damages, recover:
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(a) the price of goods accepted or of conforming goods lost or damaged within a
commercially reasonable time after risk of their loss has passed to the buyer; and
(b) the price of goods identified to the contract if the seller is unable after
reasonable effort to resell them at a reasonable price or the circumstances
reasonably indicate that such effort will be unavailing.187
Section 2-710 allows an aggrieved seller to recover incidental damages. It states:
“Incidental damages to an aggrieved seller include any commercially reasonable charges,
expenses or commissions incurred in stopping delivery, in the transportation, care and custody of
goods after the buyer's breach, in connection with return or resale of the goods or otherwise
resulting from the breach.”188
With respect to an aggrieved buyer’s pecuniary remedies, Section 2-711 provides that
when a seller fails to make delivery or repudiates or the buyer rightly rejects or justifiably
revokes acceptance, or when the breach goes to the whole contract, the buyer may cancel and (1)
cover and claim damages, or (2) recover damages for non-delivery.189 With respect to damages
for non-delivery, Section 2-713 states:
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Article with respect to proof of market price
(Section 2-723), the measure of damages for non-delivery or repudiation by the
seller is the difference between the market price at the time when the buyer
learned of the breach and the contract price together with any incidental and
consequential damages provided in this Article (Section 2-715), but less expenses
saved in consequence of the seller's breach.
(2) Market price is to be determined as of the place for tender or, in cases of
rejection after arrival or revocation of acceptance, as of the place of arrival.190
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Section 2-714 provides for the recovery of damages for breach in regard to accepted
goods. It states:
(1) Where the buyer has accepted goods and given notification (subsection (3) of
Section 2-607) he may recover as damages for any non-conformity of tender the
loss resulting in the ordinary course of events from the seller's breach as
determined in any manner which is reasonable.
(2) The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the difference at the time
and place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and the value
they would have had if they had been as warranted, unless special circumstances
show proximate damages of a different amount.
(3) In a proper case any incidental and consequential damages under the next
section may also be recovered.191
Section 2-715 sets forth an aggrieved buyer's incidental and consequential damages. It
provides:
(1) Incidental damages resulting from the seller's breach include expenses
reasonably incurred in inspection, receipt, transportation and care and custody of
goods rightfully rejected, any commercially reasonable charges, expenses or
commissions in connection with effecting cover and any other reasonable expense
incident to the delay or other breach.
(2) Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach include
(a) any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of which
the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know and which could not
reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise; and
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(b) injury to person or property proximately resulting from any breach of
warranty.192
Revised Version of U.C.C. Article Two. In 2003, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Law and the American Law Institute promulgated a revised
version of Article Two. To date, no states have adopted the revised version. The changes to
Article Two, especially to the remedies section of Article Two, are relatively minor.
With respect to a seller’s remedies in the event a buyer breaches a contract for the sale of
goods, Section 2-708 of the revised version of Article Two provides that, in addition to
collecting incidental damages in a damage award, a seller may also recover consequential
damages.193 Section 2-708 was also revised and now provides that a seller may recover damages
under Section 2-708(2) not only if collecting damages under Section 2-708(1) is inadequate to
put the seller in the position it would have been in had the contract been performed, but also if
collecting damages under Section 2-706 is inadequate to put the seller in the position the seller
would have been in had the contract been performed. In short, if a seller is a lost-volume seller
who therefore is inadequately compensated under Section 2-708(1) or Section 2-706, the seller
may recover the full amount for the goods in question (not just the difference between the market
price and the contract price or the cover price and the contract price) under Section 2-708(2).
With respect to a buyer’s remedies in the event a seller breaches a contract for the sale of
goods, Section 2-712 of the revised version of Article Two clarifies the circumstances in which a
buyer is entitled to cover.194 Moreover, Section 2-713 clarifies the time at which the market
price in a cover situation is to be measured. According to Section 2-713(1)(a), the market price
in cases other than anticipatory repudiation is measured at the time for tender. Section 2713(1)(b), on the other hand, provides that the market price in the case of anticipatory
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repudiation is measured at the “expiration of a commercially reasonable time after the buyer
learned of the repudiation.”195
Limitations and Requirements. The recovery of damages in the United States is subject
to requirements and limitations similar to those found in common law England. These include:
causation, foreseeability, certainty, and avoidability.
Causation/Foreseeability. In order for a claimant to recover damages from a respondent,
it must prove that the respondent’s non-performance was the cause of the losses it suffered, or
the gains it was prevented from acquiring. This question often boils down to whether, within the
realm of common sense and experience, the respondent’s breach can be viewed as the cause of
the claimant’s loss.196 This concept is generally discussed in conjunction with the ideas of
remoteness and foreseeability. One commentator notes that “our only test of ‘causation’. . . is
foreseeability.”197
In the United States, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts has slightly narrowed the
principles set forth in Hadley v. Baxendale.198 The Restatement provides: “Damages are not
recoverable for loss that the party in breach did not have reason to foresee as a probable result of
the breach when the contract was made.”199 A loss may be foreseeable if “it arises in the
ordinary course of events, or . . . as a result of special circumstances, beyond the ordinary course
of events, that the party in breach had reason to know.”200 The ability of the breaching party to
foresee damages is evaluated at the time the contract was made.201
Article Two of the UCC provides a similar formulation to the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts.202 It states inter alia that a “buyer may recover as damages for any non-conformity of
tender the loss resulting in the ordinary course of events from the seller’s breach as determined in
any reasonable manner.”203 It also provides that “[c]onsequential damages resulting from the
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seller’s breach include (a) any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of
which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know and which could not reasonably be
prevented by cover or otherwise; and (b) injury to person or property proximately resulting from
any breach of warranty.”204
Certainty. Claimants cannot merely assert they have suffered a loss; they must prove it to
a reasonable degree of certainty.205 This rule applies only to the existence of loss, not the extent
of loss.206 Difficulty in assessing damages will not bar recovery.207 Furthermore, the certainty
requirement does not, as a general rule, automatically bar the awarding of damages for loss of
profits.208 In fact, in the United States, courts have been willing to award lost profits even in
cases where the claimant is a new business.209 In addition, in the United States, while courts
typically follow a no-fault rule with respect to damages, they have been “less demanding in
applying the requirement [of certainty] if the breach was ‘wilful.’”210 American courts have also
held that claims for the loss of “good will” need only be proved with “sufficient certainty.”211
Avoidability. Once a claimant has been injured by a breach of contract, it must not
unreasonably continue performance, and must desist and claim damages in which allowance will
be made for expenses saved by not completing performance.212 This is different from the
English rule, which does not require claimants to mitigate loss by accepting the respondent’s
repudiation and suing for damages.213 The burden is placed on the respondent to show the
claimant has failed in this respect.214 In mitigating, a claimant is not required to do anything that
might injure the claimant’s commercial reputation.215
The arbitral tribunal’s decision in Final Award in Case No. 8362 of 1995 illustrates the
application of the certainty and foreseeability requirements and the calculation of damages in a
transnational contract dispute.216 There, a United Kingdom distributor (the claimant) sought
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from an American manufacturer (the respondent), who breached an exclusive distributorship
agreement, expectation damages equal to lost net profits (i.e, estimated gross profits that it would
have received over the duration of the distribution agreement but for the respondent’s breach less
variable costs). To determine the amount of damages, the tribunal looked to the applicable law,
New York law, which provided that the claimant must show “(i) that it has suffered harm; (ii)
that such harm was caused with certainty by the breach, and (iii) that the amount of its damages
is established with reasonable certainty.”217 With respect to the first two requirements, the
tribunal determined that the claimant established with certainty that, as a direct result of the
breach, the claimant lost its rights: (i) to purchase respondent’s product at a discount, and (ii) to
the exclusive distribution of the respondent’s product in the United Kingdom and continental
Europe. This resulted in a decline in the claimant’s sales in those regions. Furthermore, the
tribunal found that “the right to resell at a profit was what was contemplated by the parties upon
concluding the Distribution Agreement, so that the loss of profit suffered from the withdrawal of
that right was clearly in the contemplation of the parties.”218 As a result, the claimant’s loss was
an immediate and direct cause of the respondent’s breach. Turning to the calculation of
damages, the tribunal noted that, under New York law, a consistently applied specific rule for
calculating net profits did not exist. However, that did not preclude the award of damages. The
tribunal explained that damages need not be calculated with precision. Instead, there only needs
to be a sound basis for determining their amount. The tribunal calculated the lost net profit owed
to the claimant as a percentage of the estimated lost sales equal to gross margin less avoided
costs.219
C.

Latin America
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Damages throughout Latin America reflect the civil law distinction between damnum
emergens and lucrum cessans, both of which are recoverable upon a breach of contract.220 For
example, the Civil Code of Brazil provides that if the respondent breaches the contract, the
respondent will be liable for the actual loss suffered by the claimant in addition to what the
claimant reasonably failed to gain.221 The amount that the claimant reasonably failed to gain is
determined by the difference between the value of the claimant’s assets had the breach not
occurred and the value of the claimant’s assets after the breach.222 This calculation includes lost
profits.223 Therefore, damages are intended to award claimants their performance interest by
placing claimants in the position they expected to be in had the contract been performed.
Damages in Argentina, meanwhile, are often categorized as either “positive” or
“negative” damage.224 Negative damage is defined as the loss a party failed to gain. Positive
damage, on the other hand, is defined as the actual loss a party incurred. In addition to these
losses, damages in Argentina may include non-compensatory recovery, such as recovery for
moral damages including the loss of business reputation.225 Recovery for these non-pecuniary
losses is conditioned on a finding that the breach was wanton, outrageous or with malice.226
Moral damages are also recoverable in breach of contract actions in Paraguay.227
Causation/Foreseeability. Losses are only compensable if they are directly caused by the
respondent’s non-performance.228 This requirement of causation is the standard throughout civil
law countries. For example, in Argentina, damages are restricted to those which are the
immediate and direct result of the breach.229 One commentator notes that directness has been
interpreted consistently with the concept of foreseeability in some cases,230 which would make
Argentinean law consistent with the civil law tradition. Where the breach is the result of dolo
(fraud), the respondent is liable for indirect consequences as well.231 In general, however, a
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respondent in Latin America is only liable for direct damage that is foreseeable as a result of the
breach of contract.232
Certainty. Generally, damages must be certain in their existence, but not in amount.233
According to the Guatemalan Civil Code, the victim of a breach of contract is only required to
prove that it suffered damages.234 Although damages for non-pecuniary loss are difficult to
prove with certainty, damages for sentimental feelings may be awarded in Mexico, but only if
the claimant can prove the respondent breached its contract with the purpose of inflicting
sentimental damage.235
Fault. Similar to some European civil codes, some Latin American countries require that
in order to establish liability against the respondent for breach of contract, the claimant must
prove the respondent was at fault in breaching the contract. The 2002 civil code of Brazil
significantly narrows this principle, allowing excused non-performance only in the case of force
majeure.236 In other Latin American countries, fault must be established but the respondent may
avoid liability if it proves its non-performance was due to some event not attributable to its own
actions.237 Meanwhile, in Argentina, in contracts where a specific result is contracted for, the
respondent is presumed to have been at fault in the event of non-performance, in contrast to
contracts for “certain means,” in which fault must be proven.238 In addition, respondents under
Paraguayan law will only be held liable for a breach of contract if their non-performance
occurred as a result of their own negligence.239
Notice. In civil law, a breach of contract does not always automatically entitle the
claimant to damages. Consequently, the claimant in most Latin American countries, unless the
contract calls for the performance to take place on a given date, typically has the formal duty of
putting the breaching party in default by notifying the breaching party of its intent to sue.240
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D.

Middle East
Contract law in the Middle East is reflective of various influences, including civil law

and Islamic law (Shari’a).241 For example, Egypt’s Civil Code of 1949 was originally based on
the French Civil Code.242 Turkey’s civil code has been heavily influenced by the Swiss Code of
Obligations.243 Before the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iran was influenced by the French and
German civil codes. Today, as a result of the Revolution, its legal system is a mix of civil and
Islamic law, however all laws in Iran are required to follow Islamic law.244 Israel, meanwhile,
has adopted a mixed system, which blends civil law, common law and, in areas reserved to
religious jurisdiction, Jewish law.245 Notwithstanding the various sources of law, the goal of
awarding damages for breach of contract in most Middle Eastern countries is to place the injured
party in the position that it would have been in had the contract been performed. How that goal
is achieved, however, varies greatly among the countries in the region.246
In many Middle Eastern countries, the primary remedy is specific performance. However,
when specific performance is impossible or too burdensome, monetary damages are awarded in
order to compensate the injured party.247 In Kuwait and Egypt, for example, a distinction is
made between damnum emergens and lucrum cessans. Both are recoverable.248 Meanwhile, in
Jordan and the U.A.E., the recovery of lost profits is not allowed. Instead, damages are based on
“the damages actually sustained at the time [the breach] occurred.”249 This reflects the dictates
of the Shari’a which views lost profits, moral prejudice, and delay in performance as intangible
elements that are not compensable.250
Kuwaiti law is more generous toward injured parties in cases of breach of contract. For
example, where defective goods have been delivered in contracts for the sale of goods, Kuwaiti
law allows the buyer to rescind the sale, return the goods, and recover both the purchase price in
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addition to damages, such as loss of profits.251 In contrast, in Jordan and the U.A.E., the buyer is
only allowed to recover the actual purchase price of the goods, unless a separate tort was
committed along with a breach of contract.252
In Iran, damages are limited to losses which the injured party actually suffered. Damages
for loss of profits are typically not awarded. However, aggrieved parties may recover the cost of
obtaining substitute performance.253
Meanwhile, in Israel, an injured party to a contract has three basic remedies: (1)
enforcement of the contract; (2) rescission of the contract; and (3) recovery of damages, which
may be recovered in addition to or independent of the first two remedies. As is the case in many
civil law countries, specific performance, not damages, is the primary remedy in Israeli law.254
The primary purpose of damages in Israel is to put claimants in the position they
expected to be in once the contract was performed, giving them the “benefit of the bargain.”255
Thus, damages are compensatory. The Israeli Remedies law states that a claimant “is entitled to
compensation for the damage caused to him . . . which the person in breach foresaw, or should
have foreseen, at the time the contract was made.”256 Damages include lost profits.257
Furthermore, like many common law countries, damages are distinguished between a claimant’s
performance interest and reliance interest, and claimants choose which measure of recovery to
seek.258 Claimants may also seek a combination of remedies, such as restitution combined with
lost profits.259 Finally, in a break from traditional English common law, non-pecuniary losses
may be recovered under Israeli contract law.260
Requirements and Limitations. Recovery of damages in Middle Eastern countries is
limited by the same constraints as those found in European civil codes. First, damages must
have been caused by the breach and must have been foreseeable. Moreover, in some countries,
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there must also be fault on the part of the non-performing party and notice must be provided in
order to put breaching parties in default of their obligations. Avoidability is also a limitation.
Causation/Foreseeability. In order to award damages for a claimant’s actual loss or loss
of profits under Kuwaiti law, the claimant must prove that its damages were the natural
consequences of the breach.261 Therefore, the respondent is typically only liable for the losses
incurred by the claimant which were foreseeable or should have been foreseeable by the
respondent at the time the contract was entered into.262 However, if the respondent is found
guilty of “fraud or gross negligence,” a claimant may recover damages that were the direct
consequence of the breach but may not have been foreseeable by the respondent at the time the
contract was entered into. 263
An illustration that damages must be both foreseeable and the direct result of the
respondent’s breach in order to be compensable, is case no.1/1984, decided by an arbitration
panel under Egyptian law.264 The claimant, a European company, entered into a contract with
the respondent, the Minister of Agriculture for an African state, to dust crop fields using
airplanes. As part of the parties’ agreement, the respondent agreed to maintain the safety of the
runway for the claimant’s flight operations. The respondent, however, failed to uphold its
contracted-for obligation and allowed a vehicle to enter the runway just as the claimant’s plane
was taxiing down the runway. The claimant’s plane crashed and the claimant subsequently
sought compensation from the respondent, for damages it suffered including the loss of profit
from a contract with another African state for crop dusting, where the same plane was being
used. In deciding this issue, the Tribunal looked to Article 221 of the Egyptian Civil Code, the
civil code governing the dispute. That provision provides:
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The judge will fix the amount of damages, if it has not been fixed in the contract
or by the law. The amount of damages includes losses suffered by the creditor and
profits of which he has been deprived, provided that the damages are the normal
result of the failure to perform the obligation or of delay in performance. These
losses shall be considered to be the normal result if the creditor is not able to
avoid them by making a reasonable effort.
When, however, the obligation arises from contract, a debtor who has not been
guilty of fraud or gross negligence will not be held liable for damages greater than
those which could have normally been foreseen at the time of entering into the
contract.265
Applying this article, the Tribunal held that the loss resulting from the separate contract was “an
indirect prejudice for which the Respondent could not be held responsible.”266
In Israel, it is essential that a claimant, in order to ensure recovery, proves its loss was
actually caused by the non-performing party’s breach of contract. In addition, the loss must have
been foreseeable, or should have been foreseeable, to the breaching party at the time the contract
was made.267
Fault. In many Middle Eastern countries, the failure to perform must be attributable to
the fault of the respondent and the fault must be the material cause of the injury.268 For example,
in Iran, the basic civil law principle of fault is explicitly required to exist in order for a claimant
to recover damages from a respondent.269 However, in Egypt, the non-performance of the
obligation is, in itself, sufficient to show fault, except in the case of force majeure or fault of the
claimant.270 In Israel, meanwhile, proof of fault is not required. Therefore, the extent of
damages awarded is not altered depending on the conduct of the breaching party. If a respondent
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acts in “bad faith” damages are not extended, as they are, for example, in Kuwait, to encompass
unforeseeable losses.271
Notice. In order for injured parties to recover damages or rescind a contract, the nonperforming party must be put on notice in Egypt.272 In Iran, if no time is called for performance,
parties must prove they demanded performance before they can be awarded damages. The party
must have authorization in order to set a period for performance.273 There is no requirement of
notice in Israel.
Certainty. According to one scholar, an important aspect of the Shari’a is that damages
may only be awarded for losses to which an exact value can be assigned.274 Since the value of
loss of profit, moral damages, and delay in performance cannot be quantified in exact numbers,
Shari’a dictates that damages for these losses may not be awarded. Some Middle Eastern
countries, however, do not follow this teaching. For example, according to Kuwait’s Civil Code,
damages for “moral prejudice” may be granted to the victim of a breach of contract.275
In Israel, pecuniary damages, including damages for lost profits, must be proven to a
reasonable degree of certainty.276 Recovery for non-pecuniary damages is available; however,
non-pecuniary damages, by their very nature are almost impossible to prove with certainty.
Consequently, in awarding non-pecuniary damages, a court may use its discretion.277
Avoidability. In many Middle Eastern countries, there is no express duty on the part of
the claimant to take reasonable actions to mitigate its losses. However, Middle Eastern codes do
provide that courts may take into consideration whether the claimant increased its losses after the
breach of contract or had any part in causing the breaching party’s non-performance in the first
place.278 This principle is illustrated by the decision of the Tribunal in case no. 12/1989, decided
under Egyptian law.279
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In that case, the claimant, an international company, was seeking damages, including lost
profits, from the respondent, an African agricultural bank after the bank cancelled the parties’
contract for the sale of grain. After the parties entered into a contract for the sale of grain, the
respondent backed out of the agreement and the claimant was left with the rejected grain. Even
though the price of grain had increased on the date the respondent backed out of the agreement,
the claimant failed to attempt to resell the goods. Consequently, the Tribunal held that “the
claimant had contributed to its own loss by failing to dispose of the cargo at a higher price and
mitigating its own loss,” and refused to award the claimant damages for lost profits, but did
award it damages for administrative and other expenses incurred in the transaction.280
The Israeli Remedies law also includes a codification of the common law requirement
that claimants mitigate their losses. Section 14(a) states that breaching parties “shall not be
liable . . . for damages which the injured party could have prevented or reduced by reasonable
measures.”281
E.

Asia
In Asia, some countries follow a common law tradition, others a civil law tradition, and a

few, like the Philippines, have mixed systems.
1.

Common Law Based Systems

India follows the common law tradition in which damages are the primary remedy for
breach of contract.282 The goal of awarding damages for breach of contract is to compensate the
claimant for loss and this entails putting the claimant in the position it would have been in had
the contract been fulfilled.283
Damages are broken down into three categories: nominal, general and special
damages.284 Nominal damages may be awarded where the actual amount of damages cannot be
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judged or where the claimant has not been able to prove any actual loss.285 General damages are
those which may not be proved beyond what a reasonable person can judge. Special damages on
the other hand are precisely quantifiable. The only real difference between general and special
damages is that special damages must be specially pleaded to be recoverable.
Damages are generally not awaded for mental anguish or for loss of reputation, however
they may be recoverable when a contract’s purpose is to provide peace of mind.286
Sale of Goods. In a contract for the sale of goods, damages typically are measured by the
difference between the contract price and the market price at the time of the breach.287 Market
price is to be determined at the place for delivery of the goods.288
Requirements and Limitations. A respondent’s liability for losses to the claimant is
limited in India by the typical requirements that the damage be caused by the respondent’s
breach and that the damage was foreseeable. The claimant must prove, with reasonable
certainty, the amount of damages it suffered. Finally, damages for loss that the claimant could
have avoided through reasonable means are not recoverable.
Causation/Foreseeability. The measure of damages in India follows the rule from
Hadley v. Baxendale. Damages are broken into two categories: 1) those which follow naturally
from the consequences of the breach in question; and 2) those for which it must be shown the
parties contemplated liability in the case of a breach.289 Mere notice to the respondent of special
circumstances will not suffice to make the respondent liable for those circumstances in the case
of a breach. The respondent must accept liability for special circumstances in the event it
breaches the contract.290
The application of the requirement that a respondent accept liability for special
circumstances is illustrated in Dominion of India v. All India Reporter Ltd.291 In that case, the
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claimant lost three volumes of a parcel of books making the entire set useless. The court found
that the railway was not liable for the loss of the entire set, as they had no notice the loss of the
three volumes would make the entire set useless.292
Certainty. In holding with the principle that damages are to be compensatory only, the
claimant must not only prove that it suffered a loss, but it must also prove the extent of the loss it
suffered. Damages need not be proven with absolute certainty. Instead, the level of certainty
must be reasonable from the viewpoint of a prudent and impartial person.293
Avoidability. A claimant must not only show adequate causation and proof of loss, it
must show that it could not have mitigated its loss by reasonable efforts.294 The claimant,
however, has no obligation to “destroy his own property, or to injure himself or his commercial
reputation, to reduce the damages payable by the defendant.”295
Final Award in Case No. 8445 of 1996 illustrates the awarding of damages in Indian
law.296 In that case, the tribunal ruled that the respondent, a German manufacturer, breached a
technology licensing agreement that it entered into with the claimant, an Indian manufacturer, by
failing to provide the claimant with documents required under the contract. The tribunal applied
the Indian Contract Act of 1872 which “provides that in order to recover for breach of contract,
the aggrieved party must show that such damage arose naturally in the usual course of things
from such breach, or was damage which the parties knew when they made the contract would be
the likely result.”297 In the case, the court found that the loss of profit was the natural result of
the respondent’s breach. The tribunal explained that “[t]he claimant unquestionably expected to
make a profit from the local manufacture and the sale of products [resulting from the licensing
agreement], and its inability to do so naturally led to a loss of profits, a result which both parties
must have known at the time they entered into the agreement.”298
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The tribunal also found that the claimant need not prove the amount of damages with
absolute certainty, and noted “[all that] is required . . . is a reasonable estimate of loss based on
such elements as are available.”299 The claimant met this test by providing detailed and reasoned
estimates of the costs of production, the prices at which the products could be sold, their
prospective market share and projected sales growth, and the ensuing profit that would have been
made. As a result, the tribunal awarded the claimant lost profits for the duration of the
agreement.300 However, the claimant’s request for damages due to loss or reputation was
rejected on the grounds that proof of such loss, and especially the quantum of any such loss, is
too speculative to serve as a basis for an award.301
2.

Civil Law Systems

China, Japan and South Korea follow the civil law tradition. In Japan and South Korea, a
claimant’s first remedy upon the other party’s breach of contract is specific performance of the
obligation.302 When specific performance is not possible or performance would be valueless,
damages are the normal remedy.303 In China, claimants also have the option to request specific
performance. However, damages are awarded when performance is impossible, specific
performance is impractical or excessive, or when the claimant requests that performance occur in
an unreasonable time frame.304
Japan and South Korea classify damages into two categories: positive interest and the
negative interest.305 The purpose of damages is to put the injured party in the position it would
have been in had the contract been performed. Following a breach of a sales contract by delay in
performance, the claimant can recover the difference between the contract price and the market
price at the time of delivery.306 Profits that were lost because of the delay may also be recovered.

44

Damages are also divided into two other categories: ordinary and special damages.307
Ordinary damages are those which are likely to arise in the “normal course of events,” while
special damages are those “resulting from special circumstance.”308 This division exists from the
importation of the principles of Hadley v. Baxendale into Japan and South Korea.309
China, on the other hand, recently made a large step towards a comprehensive law of
contracts with the enactment of the Uniform Contract Law of China (UCL).310 Roughly modeled
on both the Convention on the International Sale of Goods and the UNIDROIT Principles of
contract, damages under the new law are designed to compensate a claimant for the loss which
the respondent’s breach of contract caused.311 This places the claimant in the position in which it
expected to be once the contract was performed.312 The UCL, unlike the Uniform Commercial
Code in the United States, does not provide specific provisions on the calculation of damages.313
In Japan, where the only obligation of the respondent consists of the payment of money,
damages are specifically limited to the amount of interest owed on the money. The claimant
does not have to prove damages.314 In addition, fault need not be proven when the only
obligation is the payment of money.315 This situation may arise where a buyer refused to pay for
goods received, and it is generally accepted that sellers may not recover damages beyond the
delayed interest, even if proven.316
Sale of Goods. There is no separate law in Japan governing contracts for the sale of
goods. Damages typically equal the difference between the contract and market price, or where
a resale has occurred, the difference between the contract price and resale price. In general, the
buyer’s expected profits fall into the category of special damages.317
In sale of goods cases in China, where a buyer has breached a contract, Article 109 of the
UCL provides that the seller may demand the price. However, there does not appear to be a
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requirement that the seller be unable to resell the goods.318 This would probably not create a
problem of windfall to the seller because the duty to mitigate losses makes it nearly impossible
for the seller to be able to sit on the goods and collect the goods’ price from the recalcitrant
buyer. If the goods fail to meet the quality required under the contract, the buyer has the right to
either demand that the seller bear the cost of curing the defect, or demand that the seller replace
the goods. The buyer may also return the goods, and the buyer can ask for a reduction in
price.319
Limitations and Requirements. In order for a claimant to collect damages after a breach
of contract, the claimant must be able to prove that the loss was caused by the respondent’s nonperformance.320 Some countries also require that the claimant prove that the respondent’s nonperformance is attributable to the fault of the respondent and that, to a reasonable degree of
certainty, the claimant’s loss was not due to its own fault.321 A claimant must also mitigate its
losses, and bear the cost if it fails to take reasonable efforts to prevent the aggravation of its
losses.322
Causation/Foreseeability. As to the scope of damages available, contract law in Japan
and Korea were influenced by Germanic legal theory and consequently the extent of liability for
breach of contract in these two countries is determined according to the concept of adequate
causation.323 The civil codes of both Korea and Japan restrict damages to those which would
ordinarily arise from the non-performance of the obligation.324 The respondent is responsible for
“damages that have arisen through special circumstances, only if he had foreseen or could have
foreseen such circumstances.”325
This distinction between ordinary and extraordinary loss is not always easy to make and
depends largely on the facts of each case.326 Normal loss has included such things as the cost of
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finding alternative goods.327 It has also included the profit which a buyer intends to make on the
resale of goods.328 In one case, however, the court found that a contract to resell goods at triple
the purchase price was a special circumstance that could not have been foreseen by the seller.329
In China, a country which modeled the recently promulgated UCL on the Convention on
the International Sales of Goods, in order for a claimant to collect damages from a respondent,
the damages must have been foreseeable at the time the parties entered into the contract.330
Fault. Fault is also an important consideration in a breaching party’s liability for
damages in Korea and Japan. If, for example, an owner of a boat sells the boat and the boat is
subsequently destroyed, the owner is not responsible for compensating the buyer if the owner of
the boat was not at fault in the destruction.331 This principle, however, does not apply to a seller
who was already in breach by delay when the subject matter of the sale was destroyed. Fault on
the part of the respondent is also required in order for the respondent to be liable for damages for
delay of performance or positive breach of contract.332 Fault, however, is not required when the
only obligation is the payment of money.333
Avoidability. In Korea and Japan, “[i]f there has been any fault on the part of the obligee
. . . the Court shall take it into account in determining the liability of the respondent and
assessing the amount of damages.”334 The language of these provisions refers to the
respondent’s fault in the non-performance of the obligation, but it also refers to the claimant’s
fault in contributing to its losses.335 The requirement of fault puts a less rigorous burden on the
claimant than the requirement in common law jurisdictions that the party use reasonable efforts
to mitigate its loss.
In China, Article 114 of the UCL enunciates the rule of mitigation. It states that the party
suffering any loss must take prompt measures to prevent further losses. If the party suffering the
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loss does not take measures to prevent further losses, that party does not have the right to claim
compensation for any additional loss.336
F.

Oceania
New Zealand and Australia both follow the common law tradition and thus the rules

regarding damages for breach of contract in New Zealand and Australia are similar to the AngloAmerican and English common law rules regarding damages for breach of contract.337
In Australia and New Zealand, damages are the primary and often the only remedy of an
injured party to a contract.338 The point of damages for breach of contract in New Zealand and
Australia is to put the claimant in the position it expected to be in had the contract been
performed.339 Damages are often considered to fall into one of three types of interest following a
breach of contract: restitution, reliance and performance interest.340 A combination of damages
can be pursued, as long as double recovery does not result.341
Like in England, a court in Australia and New Zealand can award general, special or
nominal damages.342 Nominal damages are awarded when the claimant cannot show any loss
but it is clear the other party committed a breach of contract.343
Compensation for emotional harm and distress is generally considered inappropriate in
breach of contract cases, particularly in commercial cases.344 However, if damages for mental
distress were within the contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was entered into,
they may be recoverable.345
Putting the claimant in the position it expected to be in after the contract was performed
requires compensation for two types of damages in Australian law: loss for the benefit promised
under the contract; and consequential loss. To determine the first, the court must place a value
on the performance which the claimant was wrongfully denied. This is not always easy and
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different approaches are used in the various contractual settings. For instance, in a construction
contract, a contractor who unjustifiably leaves a job is liable for the cost to complete the work.
Consequential loss includes losses which would not have been suffered had the contract been
performed, such as lost profits, expenses in performing obligations under the contract, and
wasted expenditures. These losses often are the type of losses which are not compensable under
the limitation on remote damage.346
Sale of Goods. Contracts for the sale of goods in New Zealand and Australia are
governed by each country’s Sale of Goods Act.347 The remedies of the buyer and seller are
separate, but the effect of the available remedies is to award the non-breaching party its
performance interest.348
The seller has the right to damages only where the goods have not been accepted, or have
been accepted late. However, a buyer has a right to damages upon non-delivery (including late
delivery) and breach of warranty.349
In the case of a seller’s failure to deliver goods, damages are assessed as the difference
between the contract price and the market price.350 If goods are delivered late, damages are
assessed as the difference between the contract price and the market price at the time the goods
were to be delivered.351
In Australia, the buyer may recover damages for breach of warranty, and failure to
deliver.352 The buyer may also claim restitution for any money paid when the consideration for
the payment failed, such as non-delivery.353
Requirements and Limitations. Australia and New Zealand both share the same
limitations and requirements found in England and the United States with respect to the recovery
of damages. The loss to the claimant must be caused by the respondent’s non-performance, the
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loss must not be too remote, the claimant must be able to show the loss to a reasonable degree of
certainty, and the claimant must have taken reasonable efforts to minimize its loss.
Causation/Foreseeability. A causal connection must exist between the respondent’s
breach and the claimant’s loss.354 It is irrelevant that the claimant may have contributed to its
own loss, unless the claimant’s contribution is so great that it breaks the causal chain between the
respondent and the loss.355
Both Australia and New Zealand restrict the recovery of damages according to the
foreseeability principle enunciated in Hadley v. Baxendale. In New Zealand, however, Hadley is
only a starting point for the consideration of whether the claimant’s loss is too remote to be
compensable. In the case of McElroy Milne v. Commercial Electonics Ltd.,356 the court found
that “reasonable foresight or contemplation, . . . are always . . . important consideration[s]. I
doubt whether they are the only consideration[s].”357 The court went on to hold that other factors
including the respondent’s culpability should be taken into consideration.358
The two types of losses created by Hadley are still applicable to questions of recoverable
damage.359 In a case where delay in payment for scoured wool resulted in further loss in
conversion to New Zealand dollars, the loss was found not to be too remote.360 In general, if the
type of loss that was sustained was foreseeable, the respondent is liable regardless of the extent
of the loss.361 The rule of Hadley v. Baxendale is followed in Australia, however, it is only the
kind of loss that must be foreseeable, not the extent of the loss.362
Certainty. Damages must also be proven to a reasonable degree of certainty. The
certainty rule applies only to the fact of damages, not to the amount of damages.363 In a recent
decision, the New Zealand court of appeal awarded damages for lost profits from increased
competition even though the claimant could not produce precise figures as to the amount of
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business it lost as a result of the breach.364 The court found that it was clear the claimant had
suffered a loss and awarded the amount which the court “was satisfied that the loss could not
have been less than.”365 Thus, if the claimant provides sufficient evidence of loss or damage,366
the fact that the amount of damages are difficult to assess generally is no bar to recovery.367
Avoidability. In New Zealand and Australia a claimant must mitigate its losses upon a
breach of contract.368 In other words, the failure to mitigate results in damages being calculated
as if the claimant did not act reasonably to minimize its loss.369 If the claimant, in an attempt to
mitigate its losses, increases its losses, the respondent may still be liable if the claimant’s attempt
is deemed reasonable.370
Australia, however, follows the same rule as England, that a claimant “need not mitigate
loss, even after the [respondent’s] performance of the contract which he has repudiated falls due,
by accepting the repudiation and suing for damages.”371
IV.

DAMAGES UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS

CONVENTION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS
The United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) applies “to
contracts of sale of goods between parties whose places of business are in different countries: (a)
when the States are Contracting States; or (b) when the rules of private international law lead to
the application of the law of a Contracting State.”372 Under the CISG, if a party fails to perform
its contractual obligations, the injured party, depending on whether the injured party is a buyer or
seller, has various remedies, including damages.373 Specific performance is also more readily
available to a buyer or seller than is available under common law.374
Damages under the provisions of the CISG seek to give the injured party its performance
interest.375 CISG Article 74 provides that a claimant may recover, for breach of contract, “a sum
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equal to the loss, including loss of profit, suffered . . . as a consequence of the breach.”376 The
goal of this provision is to place the claimant in the same economic position it would have been
in had the breach not occurred. In other words, it is designed to protect a claimant’s performance
interest by giving it the benefit of the bargain.
Article 74 provides the basic principle for the recovery of damages under the CISG,
although it does not provide specific guidelines for the calculation of damages.377 In particular,
it does not contain a separate provision for the calculation of damages for breach of warranty.
Instead, Article 74 grants a tribunal the authority to determine the claimant’s “loss . . . suffered . .
. as a consequence of the breach” based on the circumstances of the particular case.378 It also
explicitly provides that damages for breach of contract include lost profits. The Secretariat
Commentary explains that the specific reference to loss of profit was included “because in some
legal systems the concept of ‘loss’ standing alone does not include loss of profit.”379
The Commentary provides the following illustrations of appropriate damages under
article 74:
Example [A]: The contract provided for the sale for $50,000 FOB of 100 machine
tools which were to be manufactured by the seller. Buyer repudiated the contract
prior to the commencement of manufacture of the tools. If the contract had been
performed, Seller would have had total costs of $45,000 of which $40,000 would
have represented costs incurred only because of the existence of this contract
(e.g., materials, energy, labour hired for the contract or paid by the unit of
production) and $5,000 would have represented an allocation to this contract of
the overhead of the firm (cost of borrowed capital, general administrative
expense, depreciation of plant and equipment). Because Buyer repudiated [the]
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contract, Seller did not expend the $40,000 in costs which would have been
incurred by reason of the existence of this contract. However, the $5,000 of
overhead which were allocated to this contract were for expenses of the business
which were not dependent on the existence of the contract. Therefore, those
expenses could not be reduced and, unless the Seller has made other contracts
which have used his entire productive capacity during the period of time in
question, as a result of Buyer's breach Seller has lost the allocation of $5,000 to
overhead which he would have received if the contract had been performed.
Thus, the loss for which Buyer is liable in this example is $10,000.
Contract price $50,000 [less] expenses of performance which could be saved
$40,000 [equals] loss arising out of breach $10,000.
Example [B]: If, prior to Buyer's repudiation of the contract in Example [A],
Seller had already incurred $15,000 in non-recoverable expenses in part
performance of the contract, the total damages would equal $25,000.
Example [C]: If the product of the part performance in Example [B] could be sold
as salvage to a third party for $5,000, Seller's loss would be reduced to
$20,000.380
Articles 75 and 76 set forth guidelines on how damages are to be calculated in instances
where the basic measure of damages set forth in Article 74 may not adequately compensate the
injured party. Article 75 provides a method for calculating damages when the contract has been
avoided and the “buyer has bought goods in replacement or the seller has resold the goods.”381
Here, the claimant “may recover the difference between the contract price and the price in the
substitute transaction as well as any further damages recoverable under Article 74.”382 However,
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a claimant may use this method only if the resale or cover purchase was made “in a reasonable
manner and within a reasonable time after avoidance[.]”383 The purpose of these requirements is
to prevent the unfairness of having a party pay for loss which the other party caused through
hasty or malicious conduct.
If the contract has been avoided but the injured party has not bought goods in
replacement or resold the goods under Article 75, then Article 76 provides a different method for
calculating damages. It provides that:
If . . . there is a current price for the goods, the party claiming damages may . . .
recover the difference between the price fixed by the contract and the current
price at the time of avoidance as well as any further damages recoverable under
Article 74. If, however, the party claiming damages has avoided the contract after
taking over the goods, the current price at the time of such taking over shall be
applied instead of the current price at the time of avoidance.384
The price to be used in determining damages under this article is “the price prevailing at
the place where delivery of the goods should have been made or, if there is no current price at
that place, the price at such other place as serves as a reasonable substitute, making due
allowance for differences in the cost of transporting the goods.”385 This method of measuring
damages is called the “market-price-rule.” It allows the claimant to calculate its damages
independently from any cover transaction. If the contract does not fix a price and there is no
current price within the meaning of Article 76, damages may be calculated under Article 74.386
Unlike in some civil law countries, the CISG does not limit damages to those situations
involving a negligent or willful breach.387 However, it excludes damages for death or personal
injury caused by goods to any person.388
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Requirements and Limitations. Similar to the practice in many common law and civil
law countries, the CISG imposes upon the claimant the burden of providing evidence of damage
and of causation between the breach and the loss suffered.389 Unlike in civil law countries,
liability for breach of contract is generally strict, and thus no fault has to be shown.390 In
addition, like many common law and civil law countries, the CISG limits recovery of damages
pursuant to the doctrines of foreseeability, avoidability and, perhaps certainty.
Certainty. It is unclear whether the CISG contains a certainty requirement. The CISG
does not explicitly provide the level of proof needed for a claimant to recover damages.391 To
date, there has been controversy over whether the issue of certainty is addressed by the
Convention or whether it is a procedural matter that should be resolved by the domestic law of a
country in which a dispute governed by the CISG is being decided. Some courts and tribunals
have held that the issue is a procedural matter beyond the scope of the Convention and governed
by the law of the forum,392 while others have held it is a matter governed by the CISG.393
The standard of proof that has been employed by courts and tribunals deciding damages
claims under the Convention has varied significantly. Some courts and tribunals have required a
specific ascertainment of damages.394 Others have required that they be reasonably
proved,395and others have required sufficient proof of damages.396
Causation/Forseeability. The CISG requires that a causal link exist between the breach
of contract and the loss suffered.397 In addition, Article 74 limits damages for breach of contract
to those that were “foreseeable.”398 The CISG employs both an objective and subjective test by
stating that “damages may not exceed the loss which the party in breach foresaw or ought to
have foreseen at the time of the conclusion of the contract, in light of the facts and matters of
which he then knew or ought to have known, as a possible consequence of the breach of
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contract.”399 The latter (the objective test) asks whether a reasonable party in the same situation
could expect the loss from its non-performance.400
The relevant time with respect to determining whether the loss was foreseeable is the
time that the contract was entered into. That is, “[t]he facts and matters must have existed at the
time of the conclusion of the contract and/or must be foreseeable at the conclusion of the
contract, like seasonal market fluctuations, difficulties in transport caused by bad weather . . .
.”401
It is also important to note that Article 74 “gauges foreseeability in terms of possible
consequences.”402 Thus, a claimant need not show awareness that the loss was a “probable
result” or a substantial probability,403 only that it was a possible result of the breach.404
Avoidability. The CISG also embraces the concept of avoidability. Article 77 provides:
“A party who relies on a breach of contract must take such measures as are reasonable in the
circumstances to mitigate the loss, including loss of profit, resulting from the breach. If he fails
to take such measures, the party in breach may claim a reduction in the damages in the amount
by which the loss should have been mitigated.”
The CISG thus provides that a party must undertake reasonable steps to minimize its loss.
The mitigation requirement “applies to an anticipatory breach of contract . . . as well as to a
breach in respect of an obligation the performance of which is currently due.”405 The
Commentary explains, “[i]f it is clear that one party will commit a fundamental breach of the
contract, the other party cannot await the contract date of performance before he declares the
contract avoided and take measures to reduce the loss arising out of the breach by making a
cover purchase, reselling the goods or otherwise.”406
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Like in common law and civil law countries, the failure of a party to mitigate its losses
does not result in liability. Rather, the failure to mitigate results in the claimant’s damages being
reduced by the amount which should have been mitigated.407
The following cases illustrate the awarding of damages under the CISG. In ICC
Arbitration Award in Case No. 8786 of January 1997, an arbitrator relied on Article 74 of the
CISG in awarding damages for breach of contract. 408 In the case, hours after being notified that
the seller, a clothing manufacturer, would not be able to deliver certain seasonal goods to the
buyer, a retail store, as provided for in the parties’ agreement, the buyer terminated the contract
under CISG Article 72(1). That provision states, “[i]f prior to the date for performance of the
contract it is clear that one of the parties will commit a fundamental breach, the other party may
declare the contract avoided.”409 The arbitrator determined that the seller’s actions amounted to
a fundamental breach and that the buyer validly terminated the agreement. With respect to
damages, the arbitrator noted that the CISG provided that “[d]amages for breach of contract by
one party consist of a sum equal to the loss of profit suffered by the other party as a consequence
of the breach.”410 Based on this provision, the arbitrator ruled that the buyer was entitled to lost
profits, indirect loss of profits, as well as expenses incurred as a result of the breach (such as
travel costs). The arbitrator then noted that these damages were foreseeable. The arbitrator
explained that, with respect to lost profits, the seller “should have known that the goods were to
be sold in the [buyer’s] retail store and also that the goods were seasonable in nature.
Accordingly, late delivery would mean that the goods could only be sold for a reduced price
once they were out of season and therefore profits would be lost.”411 The seller had argued that
the buyer was not entitled to damages because it failed to take reasonable mitigation measures as
required by Article 77. The arbitrator rejected that claim, noting that the seller bore the burden
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of proof on the issue and it had failed to offer any evidence that the buyer did not take
appropriate measures to mitigate its loss.412
In Delchi Carriers v. Rotorex Corp., the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed in part an award of damages against an Rotorex, American seller, who provided
to Delchi Carriers, an Italian manufacturer of air conditioners, compressors that did not conform
to the terms of the contract between the parties.413 There, the lower court had awarded Delchi
Carriers lost profits and certain incidental damages.
The Second Circuit initially noted that the damages provisions of the CISG, which
governed the contract, were “designed to place the aggrieved party in as good a position as if the
other party had properly performed the contract.”414 That is, the provisions protected both the
claimant’s performance and reliance interests.
Turning first to the issue of lost profits, the Second Circuit ruled that Delchi Carriers was
entitled to lost profits resulting from diminished volume sales. It affirmed the trial court’s
findings that Delchi Carriers lost sales as a direct result of Rotorex’s failure to provide
conforming goods, and that lost profits were a foreseeable consequence of the breach.
Interestingly, the Second Circuit also agreed with the trial court that Delchi Carriers was only
entitled to those damages that it could prove with sufficient certainty, even though the CISG
imposed no such requirement.415 Since the CISG did not address the issue, both the Second
Circuit and the trial court concluded that the traditional common law damage limitation that the
claimant must provide sufficient evidence to estimate damages with reasonable certainty should
apply.416
With respect to the calculation of lost profits, the Second Circuit noted that the CISG
was silent on the issue. As a result, it ruled that the trial court correctly applied the standard
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formula in the United States for calculating lost profits which, applied to the case, equaled the
lost sales resulting from Rotorex’s breach multiplied by the average sales price less Delchi
Carriers’ variable costs. The Second Circuit ruled that fixed costs should not be deducted from
the sales revenue in calculating lost profits because such costs would have been encountered
whether or not the breach occured.417
Turning to Delchi Carriers’ claims for incidental damages, the Second Circuit noted that
the trial court had awarded damages to Delchi Carriers to compensate it for costs incurred in: (1)
attempting to remedy the non-conformity of Rotorex’s compressors, (2) handling and storing the
rejected compressors, and (3) mitigating its damages by expediting the delivery of compressors
previously ordered from another supplier. The Second Circuit affirmed that portion of the award
based on the principle that an injured party is entitled to damages for the full loss incurred as a
result of the breach. The trial court had denied, however, Delchi Carriers damages for: (1)
shipping, customs and other charges incurred in rejecting and returning the nonconforming
compressors to Rotorex, (2) materials purchased for use only with Rotorex compressors, and (3)
the labor costs incurred when the production line was idle because of the lack of compressors to
install in air conditioning units. The trial court ruled that these costs were accounted for in
Delchi’s claims for lost profits. The Second Circuit disagreed. It noted that these costs were
reasonably foreseeable and legitimate incidental or consequential damages, and that the lost
profits award would not compensate Delchi Carriers for those expenses. It explained:
An award of lost profits will not compensate Delchi for the expenses in question.
Delchi’s lost profits are determined by calculating the hypothetical revenues
derived from unmade sales less hypothetical variable costs that would have been,
but were not incurred. This figure, however, does not compensate for costs
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actually incurred that led to no sales. Thus, to award damages for costs actually
incurred in no way creates double recovery and instead furthers the purpose of
giving the injured party damages “equal to the loss.”418
The court noted, however, that it was unclear whether labor costs were fixed or variable costs.
As a result, it stated that Delchi Carriers would be entitled to be reimbursed for labor costs only
if, on remand, the trial court was able to determine that its labor expenses were incurred only as a
result of the breach.419
V.

THE AWARDING OF DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF
CONTRACT UNDER GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY
Some international tribunals have resolved claims for damages for breach of contract on
general principles, such as those contained in the UNIDROIT Principles of International and
Commercial Contracts, or on principles of equity.420 Those principles are typically based on
rules found in national laws.
A.

The UNIDROIT Principles
The UNIDROIT Principles of International and Commercial Contracts set forth general

rules for international commercial contracts.421 They may be applied when the parties have
agreed that the contract shall be governed by the Principles or when the contract is to be
interpreted in accordance with general principles of law, including lex mercatoria. They also
may be used to interpret or supplement existing international instruments, such as the CISG.422
Like the CISG, the UNIDROIT Principles provide that a party to a contract who has been
aggrieved by the other party’s non-performance of its obligations has a right to compensation for
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the full amount of the loss it suffered as a result of the breach.423 In other words, the goal of the
damages provisions of the UNDROIT Principles is to protect a claimant’s performance interest.
The scope of damages that a claimant may recover for breach of contract is broader under
the UNIDROIT Principles than under the CISG. Like the CISG, the UNIDROIT Principles
explicitly provide for the recovery of lost profits.424 But unlike the CISG, UNIDROIT Principles
also explicitly provide for non-pecuniary loss such as physical suffering or emotional distress.425
If, after the breach of contract, the claimant makes a replacement transaction, Article
7.4.5 of the UNIDROIT Principles measures the claimant’s damages as the difference between
the contract price and the current price of the goods at the time the contract is terminated, as well
as damages for any further harm. This provision is similar to CISG Article 75. Like in the
CISG, Article 7.4.5 requires the replacement transaction to have been made within a reasonable
time and in a reasonable manner.426
If, after the breach of contract, the claimant terminates the contract but does not make a
replacement transaction, the UNIDROIT Principles Article 7.4.6 provides that the claimant may
recover the difference between the contract price and the current price of the goods at the time
the contract is terminated, as well as damages for any further harm, provided that there exists
such a current price.427 The “[c]urrent price is the price generally charged for goods or services
rendered in comparable circumstances at the place where the contract should have been
performed or, if there is no current price at that place, the current price at such other place that
appears reasonable to take as a reference.”428 The Comment to Article 7.4.6 states that the
current price “will often, but not necessarily, be the price on an organized market.”429 In
addition, “the place relevant for determining the current price is that where the contract should
have been performed or, if there is no current price at that place, the place that appears
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reasonable to take as a reference.”430 The remedy provided by Article 7.4.6 is similar to CISG
Article 76.
The UNIDROIT Principles limit the right to damages in a variety of ways. Article 7.4.7,
for example, limits the right to damages if the claimant has contributed to the harm. It states:
“[w]here the harm is due in part to an act or omission of the aggrieved party or to another event
as to which that party bears the risk, the amount of damages shall be reduced to the extent that
these factors have contributed to the harm, having regard to the conduct of each of the
parties.”431
The UNIDROIT Principles also limit damages through the familiar concepts of causation,
foreseeability, certainty and avoidability.
Causation/Foreseeability. The UNIDROIT Principles provide that “[t]he nonperforming party is liable only for harm which it foresaw or could reasonably have foreseen at
the time of the conclusion of the contract as being likely to result from its non-performance.”432
Like the CISG, the UNIDROIT Principles contain both subjective and objective tests for
foreseeability. However, in contrast to the CISG which requires that the foreseeable harm be a
“possible” consequence of the non-performance of the contract, the UNIDROIT Principles state
that such harm must be a “likely” result of the breach.433 Thus, the UNIDROIT Principles
appear to take a slightly more restrictive view on foreseeability than the CISG.
The Comment to the UNIDROIT Principles explains that the concept of foreseeability
relates to the nature or type of harm and not to its extent, unless the extent transforms the harm
into one of a different kind.434 It also makes clear that the requirement of foreseeability goes
hand-in-hand with the requirement of certainty.435 Thus, a claimant is required to show that “it
must have been foreseeable that harm with certainty (is likely) to flow from such a breach.”436
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Furthermore, the Comment clarifies that, unlike some civil law systems, a respondent is not
liable for unforeseeable harm even if the breach was willful.437 Finally, the Comment states:
What is foreseeable is to be determined by reference to the time of the conclusion
of the contract and to the non-performing party itself (including its servants or
agents), and the test is what a normally diligent person could have reasonably
have foreseen as the consequence of non-performance in the ordinary course of
things and the particular circumstances of the contract, such as the information
supplied by the parties or their previous transactions.438
Certainty. The UNIDROIT Principles provide that “[c]ompensation is due only for harm,
including future harm, that is established with a reasonable degree of certainty.”439 If the
claimant cannot establish the amount of damages with sufficient certainty, the UNIDROIT
Principles state that the tribunal would have the discretion to set the amount.440 The UNIDROIT
Principles also allow recovery of damages for the loss of chance in proportion to the probability
of its occurrence.441
Avoidability. Article 7.4.8 of the UNIDROIT Principles precludes recovery for any harm
that the claimant could have avoided by taking reasonable steps.442 The Comment explains that
“[t]he purpose of this article is to avoid the aggrieved party passively sitting back and waiting to
be compensated for harm which it could have avoided or reduced.”443
Under the UNIDROIT Principles, the claimant need not undertake mitigation measures
that are unduly time-consuming and costly. Rather, the claimant is required to undertake
reasonable efforts to limit the extent of the harm or to avoid an increase in the initial harm.444
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If the claimant fails to undertake the required mitigation measures, its damages will be
reduced proportionately. That is, its damages are reduced to the extent of the loss that could
have been avoided by taking reasonable steps.445
Article 7.4.8 also provides that “[t]he aggrieved party is entitled to recover any expenses
reasonably incurred in attempting to reduce the harm.”446
The following cases illustrate the awarding of damages under the UNIDROIT Principles.
In Arbitral Award No. A-1795/51, an arbitral tribunal relied on the UNIDROIT Principles in
awarding claimant damages for breach of an agency agreement.447 The tribunal noted that
Articles 7.4.1 and 7.4.2 “affirm an aggrieved party’s right to full compensation for the harm it
sustained as a result of the other party’s non-performance but exclude compensation for
emotional suffering and distress, the aggrieved party being a corporate entity.”448 It also relied
upon Articles 7.4.3 (certainty of harm) and 7.4.4 (forseeability of harm) to exclude certain costs
sought by the claimant, including the purchase of a house where the agency contract was to be
performed.449
In Arbitral Award No. 8502, an ICC panel applied UNIDROIT Principles Article 7.4.6 to
determine the amount owed to the claimant (a Dutch buyer) as the result of the respondent’s (a
Vietnamese seller’s) breach of its contract for the sale of rice.450 The tribunal ruled that, under
Article 7.4.6, the claimant was entitled to the difference between the contract price and the
relevant market price. With respect to determining the relevant market price, the tribunal
concluded that it should be the market price at the place where the delivery of goods should have
been made, which was specified in the contract as being Ho Chi Minh City.451
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B.

Principles of European Contract Law
The Principles of European Contract Law (PECL) were drafted and promulgated by the

Commission on European Contract Law, a body of lawyers consisting of individuals from every
member State of the European Union.452 The PECL were promulgated by the Commission in
“response to a need for a Union-wide infrastructure of contract law to consolidate the rapidly
expanding volume of Community law regulating specific types of contract.”453 They are
analogous to model laws in the United States, in that they are not enforceable law, but rather are
a model law that may be adopted as law by the European Union or even the member states (or
future member states) of the European Union, much like the Uniform Commercial Code in the
United States.454 Moreover, the PECL were also promulgated by the Commission so that parties
from different States could expressly adopt them to govern international contracts.455 Finally,
the Commission promulgated the PECL with the long-term goal of “harmonis[ing]” contract law
throughout the Member States of the European Union.456 In drafting the Principles, the
Commission members were influenced by the national laws of every Member State of the
European Union.457 The drafters were also influenced by legal materials from within as well as
outside Europe.458
The goal of the damages provisions of the PECL, like the CISG and the UNIDROIT
Principles, is protecting a claimant’s performance interest. Article 9:502 states: “[t]he general
measure of damages is such sum as will put the aggrieved party as nearly as possible into the
position in which it would have been if the contract had been duly performed. Such damages
cover the loss which the aggrieved party has suffered and the gain of which it has been
deprived.”459
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In addition to providing recovery for actual loss and the loss of future profits,460 the
PECL, like the UNIDROIT Principles, provide for recovery of non-pecuniary loss such as pain
and suffering, inconvenience and mental distress.461 The PECL also allow recovery for damages
for loss of chance462 and loss of goodwill.463 Although the PECL do not explicitly state that any
loss suffered by the claimant after a breach of contract must be offset by any gain to the claimant
caused by the breach of contract, the Comment to Article 9:502 does.464
If the claimant makes a substitute transaction after the breach of contract, Article 9:506 of
the PECL provides that the claimant may recover the difference between the original contract
price and the price of the substitute transaction, as well as any further loss.465 Like the CISG and
UNIDROIT Principles, the PECL require that the substitute transaction have been made in a
reasonable manner and within a reasonable time after the breach.466
If the claimant does not make a substitute transaction after a breach of contract, the PECL
provide that the claimant may recover the difference between the contract price and the current
price of the contracted-for goods or services as well as any further loss. The PECL measure the
current price of the goods or services as the price at the time the contract was terminated.
Although both the CISG and UNIDROIT state the location at which the current price of goods is
to be determined, the PECL do not.467
The PECL limit the right of the claimant to seek damages in a variety of ways. Article
9:504, like Article 7.4.7 of the UNIDROIT Principles, limits a claimant’s right to damages if the
claimant contributed to the breach of contract.468 According to the Comment to Article 9:504,
not only is a claimant precluded from collecting damages for non-performance to which it
contributed, but a claimant is also precluded from collecting damages for additional loss after a
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non-performance for which it was not responsible if it exacerbates the adverse effects of the nonperformance.469
Like the UNIDROIT Principles and the CISG, the PECL also limit damages through the
customary concepts of causation, certainty, foreseeability and avoidability.
Causation/Foreseeability. The PECL provide that “the aggrieved party may not recover
damages for loss not caused by the failure to perform.”470 If the respondent claims that an
intervening unforeseeable event occurred that should preclude it from being liable for nonperformance, the PECL provide that the question, “whether that event would have had an impact
on the contract if the failure in performance had not occurred,” must be answered in the
affirmative in order to deem an event something that breaks the chain of causation.471
Certainty. Unlike the UNIDROIT Principles which explicitly require that damages be
proven with a reasonable degree of certainty, the PECL discuss certainty only in a note, stating
that most systems “generally require a sufficient degree of ‘certainty’ of loss” in order to award
damages, but this is not to be taken literally.472
Foreseeability. Like the CISG and the UNIDROIT Principles, the PECL provide for the
use of both subjective and objective tests of foreseeability.473 The PECL, like the UNIDROIT
Principles, also appear to take a slightly more restrictive view on foreseeability than the CISG
stating that the harm caused by the breach of contract must have been the “likely” result of the
breach.474 In contrast to both the CISG and UNIDROIT, the PECL provide an exception to the
foreseeability requirement, allowing the claimant the right to recover unforeseeable damages in
the event that the nonperformance of the respondent was intentional or grossly negligent.”475
The comment to the PECL supplies an illustration of an intentional breach where unforeseeable,
but nevertheless, recoverable damages occurred:
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A contracts with B to construct and erect stands for a major exhibition at which
leading electronic firms will display their equipment, hiring the stands from B. A
week before the exhibition is due to open A demands a substantial increase in the
contract sum. B refuses to pay, pointing out that A’s failure to complete the
remaining stands will not only cost B revenue but expose it to heavy liability to an
exhibitor C, which intended to use the exhibition to launch a major new product.
A nevertheless withdraws its workforce, with the result that C’s stand is not ready
in time and it claims substantial compensation from B. A’s breach being
intentional and with knowledge of the likely consequences, the court has to award
B an indemnity in respect of its liability to C, even though A could not reasonably
have foreseen the magnitude of such liability at the time it made its contract with
B. The same may be done even if A was not aware of the serious consequences
for B of the intentional breach.476
Avoidability. According to Article 9:505, the respondent is not liable for losses suffered
by the claimant if the claimant could have mitigated its losses.477 A claimant can fail to mitigate
its losses in two ways: 1) if the claimant incurs unnecessary or unreasonable expenditure; or 2) if
the claimant fails to take reasonable steps which would reduce its loss or offset its gains.478 The
claimant, however, is not expected to go above and beyond the call of duty and is only expected
to take reasonable steps to mitigate its losses.479 The claimant is also expected to refrain from
taking steps that are unreasonable.480
Like under the UNIDROIT Principles and the CISG, the claimant may recover any
expenses it incurred in mitigating its losses.481 Finally, even if the claimant takes steps beyond
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what is reasonably expected and subsequently reduces its losses, the reduction in its losses will
still be accounted for in awarding damages.482
C.

Damages Decided Ex Aequo Et Bono
Sometimes a tribunal will decline to select a particular law to be applied to a contractual

dispute, and instead base its decision on principles of fairness. This approach, however, is only
used when the tribunal has the power to decide ex aequo et bono. The arbitral tribunal’s decision
in Sapphire International Petroleum Ltd. v. National Iranian Oil Co. illustrates this practice.483
In Sapphire International Petroleum Ltd., the respondent, National Iranian Oil Company,
breached a concession agreement with the claimant after the claimant had begun exploring for oil
under the contract, but before the start of any drilling, exaction or sale. With respect to damages,
the arbitrator noted that it is well recognized by international tribunals that a wrongful breach of
contract entitles the injured party to the benefit of the bargain. In theory, this allows the claimant
to recover money for actual loss incurred as a result of the breach and any net gains prevented.
The arbitrator explained this principle as follows:
According to the generally held view, the object of damages is to place the party
to whom they are awarded in the same pecuniary position that they would have
been in if the contract had been performed in the manner provided for by the
parties at the time of its conclusion. . . . This rule is simply a direct deduction
from the principle of pacta sunt servanda, since its only effect is to substitute a
pecuniary obligation for the obligation which was promised but not performed. It
is therefore natural that the creditor should thereby be given full compensation.
This compensation includes loss suffered (damnum emergens), for example
expenses incurred in performing the contract, and the profit lost (lucrum cessans),
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for example the net profit which the contract would have produced. The award of
compensation for lost profit or the loss of a possible benefit has been frequently
allowed by international tribunals.484
With respect to damnum emergens, the arbitrator ruled that the claimant was entitled to
expenses incurred in performing the contract, such as the cost of exploration, certain registration
fees the claimant had paid, and the amount of a letter of credit wrongfully cashed by the
respondent. With respect to lucrum cessans, the arbitrator noted that, because the contract had
been terminated at an early stage of exploration, both the commercial quantities and damages
were uncertain. The claimant’s claim was thus akin to a loss of a chance to discover oil. The
claimant’s expert opined that if the contract had not been breached, in the best case scenario, the
claimant would have made US$46 million and in the worst case (i.e., if there were no
commercial quantities of oil), it would have lost US$8 million. Fixing the quantity ex aequo et
bono by considering all circumstances, including accounting for risks such as the possibility of
wars and price recession, the arbitrator awarded claimant US$2 million in lost profits.
VI.

TRIBUNAL AWARDS

Tribunals deciding transnational contract disputes typically do not have much difficulty
in determining whether a claimant is entitled to damages once they have found that there has
been a wrongful breach of contract. Rather, it is the calculation of damages and, in particular,
the determination of lost profits, that has proved to be a complex process resulting in different
approaches and seemingly arbitrary awards.
Today, it is well recognized by international tribunals that a wrongful breach of contract
entitles the injured party to the benefit of the bargain.485 In theory, this allows the claimant to
recover money for actual loss incurred as a result of the breach and any net gains prevented.486
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In evaluating a claim for damages, a tribunal usually first looks to the applicable law to
determine the requirements for awarding damages, such as foreseeability and avoidability.487 If
these requirements are met, the tribunal then turns to calculating the damages.488
The cases that are most troublesome for tribunals deciding disputes between transnational
contracting parties typically involve damages claims for lost profits. Some tribunals view claims
for lost profits as being speculative and have required a higher standard of proof with respect to
such claims when applicable law is not explicit on the subject.489 For example, one panel
deciding a claim for lost profit in an investment dispute stated that in order for such damages to
be awarded the claimant must provide “detailed factual description of the circumstances of the
claimed loss, damage or injury.”490
Claims for lost profits in cases involving breaches of long term contracts may also raise
special problems for tribunals. This is particularly true in those situations where the
respondent’s breach has not just injured the claimant’s business, but destroyed it, and the tribunal
must determine the value lost. Determining these damages in this situation can be particularly
difficult because tribunals must calculate damages based on projected future earnings that may
be greatly affected by ever-changing and often unpredictable economic circumstances, such as
interest rates and energy prices. The most common approaches that tribunals have used to
determine damages in this circumstance are the book value method, the replacement value
method, and the discounted cash flow method (DCF).491
The book value method calls for the tribunal to measure the going concern by reference
to its costs. The book value method has been criticized as not accurately reflecting the value lost
because it is based on historic and not actual costs, does not account for intangible assets, and
fails to take into account the future profitability of the business.492
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The replacement value method requires a tribunal to set damages at the market value of
similar properties or entities. The problem with this method is that that there may be no
comparable businesses or opportunities to which a tribunal may look to in calculating
damages.493
The DCF method determines the value of the business by projecting the net cash flow for
a certain time period into the future and then discounting it back to present value as of the date of
the breach. It uses a discount rate that may include an inflation component and a risk factor.494
Because the DCF method values the asset lost according to its income producing capabilities, in
theory, it fully compensates the claimant by awarding an amount that reflects both the loss
incurred and gain of which it was deprived.495 The report of an expert witness in Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Iran explained the DCF method as follows:
Standard economic theory holds that market value of an asset equals its expected
future cash flows discounted to present value at the opportunity cost of capital . . .
An assets’ market value stems from its expected ability to generate cash returns
over time. Market value ultimately depends on the amount, timing, and risk of
future cash flows. Prompt, safe cash flows are naturally more valuable than
delayed, risky ones.
The relation of future cash flows to current market value is expressed in the
discounted cash flow formula, in which forecasted cash flows are discounted to
obtain present value. The appropriate discount rate is the opportunity cost of
capital, that is, the expected rate of return from investing in other assets of
equivalent risk . . . .496
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The problem with the DCF method is that it is difficult to apply. Currently, there are no
universal rules for determining the future cash flows of a business or setting an appropriate
discount rate.497 The first task requires projecting the company’s earnings based on a wide
variety of factors, including the company’s past earnings history, its projected outlook, and the
industry outlook, all of which necessarily involve many assumptions, estimates and other
subjective elements.498 The second task, setting the discount rate, requires an even more
complex calculation that takes into account multiple variables, including the expected rate of
inflation, the real rate of return, and the riskiness of the income stream.499 Accordingly, parties
often employ experts to make a DCF valuation, and tribunals sometimes employ their own
experts to assist in evaluating the parties’ claims concerning lost profits using the DCF
method.500 Nevertheless, the lack of clear rules for determining the most important factors used
in the DCF method has caused one commentator to remark that “[d]amages in complex
businesses relying on calculation of future cash flows (quite speculative) discounted to present
value by applying a specific discount rate (itself very uncertain as the risk factor added to the
risk-free discount rate is inevitably highly subjective) can be reasonably and plausibly
determined within a very wide range.”501 Others have called the DCF analysis as more of an art
form than a science.502
Not surprisingly, awards using the DCF methods sometimes seem arbitrary.503 In fact, in
one case, the tribunal appeared to “split the baby,” setting damages exactly halfway between the
claimant’s and respondent’s valuations.504 In other cases, tribunals have struggled with the DCF
method, leading to inconsistent applications.
In ICC Case No. 5946, the tribunal determined that the duration of the income projection
should last for the entire term of the contract, which was 40 months.505 By contrast, in Final
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Award in Case No. 7006, the tribunal calculated lost profits based on an income stream for one
year after the contract was breached because it felt that the claimant could have mitigated its
losses after that time.506
A number of tribunals have refused to award damages consisting of lost profits where the
business was not a going concern.507 These tribunals reason that because the business did not
have a sufficient earning history, determining lost profits in such circumstances would be too
speculative.
For example, in Levitt v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Chamber One of the Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal ruled that Iran breached its contract for the construction of a housing project and
awarded the claimant his expenses incurred as a result of the breach.508 Although the tribunal
recognized that, in principle, lost profits may be awarded in the case of a breach of contract, it
denied the claim for such profits. The tribunal reasoned:
[T]he basis for the [lost profits] claim . . . is highly speculative. . . . By the time
the Contract came to an end only initial stages of clearing and grading had been
completed, and no construction work had begun on buildings. The project
therefor reached only an early stage. . . . For these reasons, the Tribunal finds that
the Claimant has not established with a sufficient degree of certainty that the
project would have resulted in profit.509
By contrast, other tribunals have awarded lost profits even where the business that has
been destroyed is not a going concern.510 For example, in the Sapphire arbitration, the arbitrator
ruled that the claimant was entitled to lost profits for the breach of an oil concession even though
the area that was the subject of the concession had not yet been prospected. The arbitrator
explained:
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It is not necessary to prove the exact damage suffered in order to award damages.
On the contrary, when such proof is impossible, particularly as a result of the
behaviour of the author of the damage, it is enough for the judge to be able to
admit with sufficient probability the existence of the damage.511
The arbitrator relied on an expert’s report and testimony and ruled that the claimant met this
burden of showing sufficient probability of success of the prospecting if the breach had not
occurred. With respect to the amount of lost profits owed, the arbitrator noted that the claimant’s
expert provided only a rough estimate of the loss. However, this was not fatal to the claimant’s
claim. The arbitrator had been given the authority to decide ex aequo et bono and thus
concluded that he had wide discretion to fix the amount of lost profits, even though the extent
and existence of the amount of lost profits were not certain. The arbitrator awarded US$2
million for lost profits, stating that that amount was both “reasonable and equitable.”512
Recently, tribunals have dealt with an emerging issue: the invocation of the abuse of
rights doctrine to deny lost profits, even though the non-breaching party is entitled to such profits
under the contract. This issue arose in the now controversial decision of Himpurna California
Energy Ltd. v. P.T. (Persero) Perusahaan Listruik Negara.513 There, Himpurna California
Energy Ltd. entered into a contract with the Indonesian state electricity corporation, PLN, to
explore and develop geothermal resources in Indonesia, including building two power plants in
the country and selling the power generated to PLN. When PLN failed to purchase the energy
Himpurna generated, Himpurna submitted a request for arbitration, claiming that PLN breached
the contract, thus causing US$2.3 billion in damages. An ad hoc arbitral tribunal agreed that
PLN breached its contract with Himpurna.514
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Turning to the issue of damages, the tribunal initially noted that under the Indonesian
Civil Code, the applicable substantive law, damages may include “the loss which the creditor has
suffered and the profit he has been made to forego.”515 In this case, Himpurna claimed both
damnum emergens, which consisted of capital invested and expended plus interest, and lucrum
cessans, which amounted to its expected future revenue stream, discounted to reflect the time
value of money and the risk premium.
With respect to damnum emergens, the tribunal stated that Himpurna was entitled to
reimbursement for monies that Himpurna could prove that it spent in reliance on the contract.516
As a result, the tribunal awarded Himpurna as damnum emergens US$273,757,306.517
Regarding the claim for lucrum cessans, the tribunal looked to the applicable law, noting:
Art. 1246 of the Indonesian Civil Code – echoing its precursor Art. 1149 of the
French Code civil – provides for the recovery of lost profit. . . . But the code goes
on to set out limiting factors which, again, are quite familiar. Art. 1247
(congruent with Art. 1152 of the Code civil) restricts recovery to damages
foreseeable at the time of contracting; and Art. 1248 (congruent with Art. 1284 of
the Code civil) requires that damages be the “immediate and direct result of the
breach.”518
While the tribunal recognized that Himpurna was in principle entitled to lost profits, it
ruled that the calculation of these profits should not be performed in a way that would
impoverish the host state. To do so, the tribunal stated, would constitute an “abuse of right.”
According to the tribunal, the abuse of rights doctrine is a general principle of international law
that requires parties to observe good faith in the exercise of their rights. As a principle of
international law, the tribunal stated, the doctrine overrides the right to the benefit of the bargain
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under substantive law. The tribunal explained “that this is a case where the doctrine of abuse of
right must be applied in favour of PLN to prevent the claimant’s undoubtedly legitimate rights
from being extended beyond tolerable norms, on the ground that it would be intolerable in the
present case to uphold claims for lost profits from investment not yet incurred.”519 The tribunal
thus refused to calculate lost profits “as though the claimant had an unfettered right to create
ever-increasing losses for the State of Indonesia (and its people) by generating energy without
regard to whether or not PLN had any use for it[,] [e]ven if such right may be said to have
derive[d] from explicit contractual terms.”520 Accordingly, it awarded Himpurna
US$117,244,000 in lost profits, which was less than 10% of the amount claimed. The tribunal
settled on this amount by calculating Himpurna’s after-tax net cash flow projections, discounted
to the present value applying a discount rate [19%] that took into account the perceived risks of
the project, and by limiting the recoverable profits to 36% of the total claim for lost profits (so as
to exclude lost profits on investments not yet made).521
Similarly, in Patuha Power Ltd.. v. PT. Persero Perusahaan Listruik Negara, an arbitral
tribunal encountered another case arising from Indonesia’s breach of an agreement for the
exploration and development of geothermal resources. The tribunal denied the claim for lost
profits on the ground that it would be an abuse of rights to award millions in lost profits in light
of the state of the economy in Indonesia.522
By contrast, in Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Das Gas Bumi
Negara, a third arbitration arising from failed power projects in Indonesia, the tribunal awarded
the claimant lost profits.523 There, Karaha Bodas Co. (“KBC”) entered into a contract with
Pertamina, the Indonesia state owned oil company, to finance, build and operate geothermal
facilities in the Karaha area of Indonesia, and Pertamina agreed to buy energy generated by
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KBC. Indonesia subsequently suspended the projects because of the country’s financial crisis.
KBC filed for arbitration, seeking (1) a declaration that the contracts were terminated, (2)
damages of US$96 million for expenditures already made on the projects, and (3) US$512
million for the present value of expected future profits over the life of the contract.524 The
tribunal determined that Pertamina had breached its agreements with KBC and awarded KBC
US$111.1 million for lost expenditures and US$150 million for lost profits.525
Karaha Bodas subsequently filed actions to enforce the award in the United States, as
well as in Hong Kong and Canada.526 The United States District Court for the Southern District
of Texas ordered the enforcement of the award, and that order was affirmed by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. In both courts, Pertamina claimed that enforcement
should be denied because, inter alia, the damage award was contrary to public policy.527
Specifically, Pertamina argued that the “award of lost profits in this particular case, when KBC
never finished the project and the Indonesian economy was in ruins, constitutes an abuse of
rights in violation of public policy.”528 Both courts rejected that argument. The Fifth Circuit
noted that the abuse of rights doctrine was not well established in American law. Furthermore, it
stated that an action violates the abuse of rights doctrine only if one of the following three factors
is present:
(1) the predominant motive for the action is to cause harm; (2) the action is totally
unreasonable given the lack of any legitimate interest in the exercise of the right
and its exercise harms another; and (3) the right is exercised for the purpose other
than that for which it exists.529
It concluded that none of the factors were present in the instant case.530
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VII.

CONCLUSIONS

In most countries, the primary purpose of damages for a breach of contract is to place the
claimant in the position it would have been in had the contract been performed. Based upon this
principle, the laws in most countries provide that a respondent that has unlawfully failed to
perform its contractual obligations is liable for actual losses suffered by the claimant as a result
of the breach, as well as any net gains prevented. Although countries lack a common language
for identifying these concepts, the concepts are functionally the same from country to country.
All countries place limitations on damages for breach of contract, although they vary
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The most common limitations are that a claimant may only
recover losses that were directly caused by the respondent’s breach and that were foreseeable as
a probable result of the breach. Many countries also preclude the claimant from recovering
losses that it could have prevented through mitigation. Some jurisdictions also limit recovery to
those damages which can be proven with reasonable certainty.
Many civil law countries also require as a prerequisite to the recovery of damages that the
respondent be at fault in breaching the agreement. This typically means that the respondent’s
breach must have been willful or negligent. In contrast, most common law countries do not
impose such a requirement.
The study further finds that while most countries provide for the awarding of lost profits
in the event of a breach of contract, the requirements for their recovery vary among countries. In
general, lost profits are more difficult to obtain in civil law countries because many of these
countries impose a high standard of proof for their recovery.
Like the laws of most countries, the CISG, the UNIDROIT Principles and the PECL
provide that if the respondent fails to perform its contractual obligation, the claimant may
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recover the full amount of the loss it suffered, including lost profits. One significant difference
between the three is that the CISG does not allow the recovery of non-pecuniary loss, such as
emotional distress, while the UNIDROIT Principles and the PECL do. Also, like many
countries, the CISG, the UNIDROIT Principles and the PECL require that the claimant’s loss
must have been foreseeable and preclude recovery of losses the claimant could have avoided by
mitigation.
Some tribunals have awarded damages for breach of contract based on principles of
equity. In such situations, they may award damnum emergens, lucrum cessans, or both.
In light of national laws, conventions, and general principles of international law and
equity, there has been an almost universal consensus among tribunals deciding disputes between
transnational contracting parties that the goal of damages for breach of contract is to place the
injured party in the position that it would have been in had the contract been performed.
Consequently, tribunals recognize that the aggrieved party is typically entitled to recover both
losses incurred as well as gains of which it was deprived because of the breach.
However, the calculation of damages and, in particular lost profits, has proved more
troublesome for courts and tribunals deciding international contract disputes.531 This result
should not come as a surprise. The laws of most countries provide little or no guidance on how
lost profits should be calculated. Indeed, most countries simply give the judge or jury broad
discretion to fix damages, including lost profits.532 In addition, the assessment of lost profits is
not an exact science. Moreover, some of the methods used to calculate lost profits are
complicated.533 In particular, the DCF method is especially complex because it determines the
value of the business by projecting the net cash flow for a certain time period into the future and
then discounting it back to present value as of the date of the breach (taking into account inter
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alia inflation and risk). Accordingly, awards of damages by tribunals deciding transnational
contract disputes have varied greatly. However, this is not in-and-of-itself a cause for concern.
As one tribunal explained:
There is no reason to apologise for the fact that [the approach used to calculate
damages] involves approximations; they are inherent and inevitable. Nor can it
be criticised as unrealistic or unbusinesslike; it is precisely how business
executives must, and do, proceed when they evaluate a going concern. The fact
that they use ranges and estimates does not imply abandonment of the discipline
of economic analysis; nor, when adopted by arbitrators, does this method imply
abandonment of the discipline of assessing the evidence before them.534
Finally, there are steps that the parties can undertake to assist tribunal in determining
awards of damages. For example, parties can set forth in their contract how damages are to be
calculated in the event of a wrongful breach of contract, provided it does not amount to a penalty
that may not be enforced in some countries. Alternatively, parties may consider using final offer
arbitration with respect to the amount of any award of damages. In this context, this approach
calls for each party to propose to the tribunal the amount of damages that the claimant is entitled
to; the tribunal would then choose between the two totals. (This procedure would only apply if
the tribunal determined that the respondent was liable to the claimant for damages.) The
advantage of this process is that it forces parties to be more reasonable in their positions (or more
realistic in their assessment of their positions) and, in theory, should narrow the differences
between the parties concerning the amount of damages owed. In fact, this procedure also may
facilitate settlement of the dispute. As one commentator explains:
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When the only dispute between parties is a numeric value [as in final offer
arbitration], reasonable final offers provide a midpoint and a range of numbers on
which to focus negotiations. Each side can assess the likelihood that the arbitrator
will value the disputed item as worth more or less than the midpoint. This
analysis helps the parties predict which offer the arbitrator will choose. . . . [T]his
midpoint analysis promotes settlement. Close final offers usually settle because a
compromise number is easy to reach. Final offers which are far apart often settle
as well because each side fears that the arbitrator will choose the other’s offer.535
Tribunals also may consider a greater use of experts to assist in evaluating claims for
damages.536 Employing experts may help the tribunal better understand the complexities
involved in calculating damages and thus may lead to a more reasoned decision.537 The authors
of one of the leading treatises on international arbitration explain:
In international commercial arbitration, the arbitration tribunal is usually
composed of lawyers. Where matters of a specialist or technical nature arise,
such an arbitral tribunal often needs expert assistance in reaching its conclusions,
in order “to obtain any technical information that might guide it in the search for
truth. . . .” For example, . . . [e]xpert help may be needed to investigate the
quantification of a claim.538
Of course, the drawbacks are that employing experts may increase the cost of resolving the
dispute and may slow the process. These potential drawbacks may be outweighed by the
benefits, especially when substantial sums are involved.539
Tribunals also should be mindful that, where the claimant seeks both damnum emergens
and the lucrum cessans, they need to be careful to avoid double counting so that they give the
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claimant the benefit of the bargain and no more.540 The potential for double recovery is
especially great when the applicable law provides for the recovery of damnum emergens and the
lucrum cessans, and the tribunal employs the DCF method to calculate damages. As one tribunal
explained:
[F]uture net cash flow generally includes all amortization of investment there will
ever be. To ask for the full amount of the future revenue stream when also
claiming recoupment of all investment is wanting your cake and eating it too. If
the DCF method is applied in a contractual scenario to measure nothing but net
cash flow (thus excluding the accrual accounting notion of ‘income’ which may
cover non-cash items such as depreciation), there is no room for recovery of
wasted costs. In other words, when the victim of the breach of contract seeks
recovery of sunken costs, confident that it is entitled to its damnum, it may go on
to seek lost profits only with the proviso that its computations reduce future net
cash flows by allowing a proper measure of amortization.541
Thus, in general, a claimant should not be able to receive as damages for breach of contract both
the recovery of the value of its lost assets (as damnum emergens) and lost profits measured by
the discounted present value of future cash flows (as lucrum cessans) because, in such case, “the
expenses of making the contract . . . is an element included in the compensation for loss of
profit.”542 Damages should, to the extent possible, place the aggrieved party in the same
pecuniary position that it would have been in if the contract had not been breached; not a better
position than if the contract had been performed.
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art. 376(3) (Ger.). This principle has been extended to contracts outside commercial contracts by
the courts. See Treitel, op. cit., § 102 (citations omitted).
96. Treitel, op. cit., § 102; see B.W. arts. 7:36 & 7:37 (Neth.).
97. See Nicholas, op. cit., 217.
98. See Treitel, op. cit., § 100. Treitel claims that the right to price reduction in civil law is
similar to the common law remedy allowing buyers to deduct from the price the damages due to
the defect. See ibid; see, e.g. C. Civ. art 1644 (Fr.); see also Bucher, op. cit., 121. In fact, in
some countries, there is no right to damages for defective goods. See C.Civ. art. 1644 (Fr.); C.c.
art 1492 (Italy); Nicholas, op. cit., 82. Rescission, however, can be combined with damages in
the case of defective goods. See, e.g., C.Civ. arts. 1645 & 1646 (Fr.). In sale of goods cases,
France has explicitly allowed the rescission of a contract where “the seller suffers from a breach
of more than seven-twelfths of the price of realty . . . .” C. Civ. art. 1674. This is so even if the
seller has contracted away the right to rescission. See ibid. Buyers, once the contract is
rescinded, can choose to keep the goods and pay the “proper price and also one-tenth of the total
price.” Ibid., art. 1681.
99. BGB § 437 (Ger.).
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100. See, e.g., Sale of Goods Act (Den.), Sale of Goods Act (1987)(Fin.), Sale of Goods Act
(1988)(Nor.); Sale of Goods Act (1990)(Swed.).
101. See Sale of Goods Act §§ 27-40 (Fin.); Sale of Goods Act §§ 22-40 (Nor.).
102. See Sale of Goods Act §§ 51-60, 67-69 (Fin.); Sale of Goods Act §§ 51-60, 67-69 (Nor.).
103. For a list of countries that have adopted the CISG, see
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/countries/cntries.html.
104. See Bucher, op. cit., 114.
105. See C. Civ. art. 1150 (Fr.); C.C. art. 1107 (Spain); see also Cass. civ. 29 Dec. 1913, D.
1916. 1. 117; Cass. req. 24 Oct. 1932, D. 1932. 1. 176 , in Von Mehren & Gordley, op. cit.,
1114; Civil Code art. 1150 (Belg.); C.c. art. 1209 (Italy); Heikinheimo & Inkeroinen, op. cit.,
FIN-70.
In French law, the foreseeability requirement is treated in an autonomous manner as a
limit to the principle of full compensation, whereas in English law it appears as an element
relating to the directness or indirectness of the harm (remoteness of damage). See Contract Law
Today, op. cit., 275; see also C.C. arts. 1104, 1107 (Spain); Civil Code art. 1150 (Belg.).
106. C. Civ. art. 1150 (Fr.); see also C.C art. 1107 (Spain); L. Simont, “Belgium,”
Transnational Litigation BEL-64; F. Ferrari, “Comparative Ruminations on the Foreseeability of
Damages in Contract Law,” 53 La. L. Rev. 1257, 1261 (1993).
107. See C. Civ. art. 1151 (Fr.).
108. See C. Civ. art. 1150 (Fr.); see also C.C. art. 1225 (Italy); C.C. art. 1107 (Spain).
109. See C. Civ. art. 1151 (Fr.); C.C. art. 1107 (Spain). In France, damages for mental distress
may be claimed, but awarding damages for mental distress is discretionary. See Barnard &
Vlasto, “France,” Transnational Litigation FRA-106.
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110. See BGB § 252 (Ger.); Von Mehren & Gordley, op. cit., 1115.
111. RG 15 Feb. 1913, RGZ 81, 359; see Mehren & Gordley, op. cit., 1115.
112. W. Hahnkamper, “Austria,” Transnational Litigation AUS-88. Under Belgian law, only
the party directly injured by the breach of contract may bring a claim for damages. That is,
parties indirectly damaged by the respondent’s breach of contract typically may not bring a claim
for damages. See Simont, op. cit., BEL-64.
113. See Simont, op. cit., BEL-64; Asser’s Handbook, 231-32.
114. Under Italian law, if damages cannot be precisely determined, they are subject to “equitable
liquidation” by the judge. C.C. art. 1226 (Italy).
115. See Simont, op. cit., BEL-64; B. Nicholas, op. cit., 228.
116. See C.c. art. 1226 (Italy).
117. See District Court Sissach, 5 Nov. 1998 (Switz.), available at
http://cisg3.law.pace.edu/cases981105s1.html; Commercial Court St. Gallen, 3 Dec. 2002
(Switz.), available at http://cisg3.law.pace.edu/cases/021203s1.html; District Court Hamburg, 26
Sept. 1990 (Ger.), available at http://cisg3.law.pace.edu/cases/900926g1.html.
118. See Hahnkamper, op. cit., AUS-88 (Austria); Simont, op. cit., BEL 63; M. Wirth,
“Switzerland,” Transnational Litigation, SWI-76 (1997); BGB § 280 (Ger.); C.C. art. 1101
(Spain); B.W. art. 6:74 (Neth.); C. CIV. art. 1147 (Fr.).
119. See, e.g., C.C. art. 1101 (Spain); see Hahnkamper, op. cit.,. AUS-88; Simont, op. cit.,
BEL-63; Wirth, op. cit., SWI-76.
120. See BGB § 280(1) s.2 (Ger.); Hahnkamper, op. cit., AUS-89.
121. See C. Civ. art. 1147 (Fr.); Civil Code art. 1147 (Belg.); C.C. art. 1101 (Spain); C.c. art.
1218 (Italy).
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122. See ABGB §§ 1323, 1324 (Aus.).
123. See EVHGB art. 8, no. 2, 4 (Commercial Code) (Aus.).
124. See J. Herbots, “Belgium,” International Encyclopaedia of Laws, 1 Contracts ¶ 405 (1998);
see also Civil Code art. 1146 (Belg.); C. Civ. arts 1146 (Fr.); C.C. art. 1100 (Spain); C.O. art
102(1) (Switz.); ABGB § 1334 (Aus.); BGB § 281; C.c. art 1219 (Italy).
125. See Nicholas, op. cit., 237; W. De Bondt, “Contracts,” Introduction to Belgian Law 222,
237 (H. Bocken & W. de Bondt eds. 2000).
126. See Nicholas, op. cit., 237; see also C. CIV. art. 1139 (Fr.); Civil Code art. 1139 (Belg.).
127. See Nicholas, op. cit., 237; Herbots, op. cit., ¶ 405.
128. See C. Civ. art. 1146 (Fr.). This does not necessarily include cases which call for
performance at a specified date. See Nicholas, op. cit., 238. Other counties, however, have
allowed the passing of the date for performance to substitute for notice. See C.c. art. 1219
(Italy); C.O. art. 102 (Switz.); BGB § 286(2)(1) (Ger.).
129. See C. Civ. art. 1139 (France); C.C. art. 1100 (Spain);
130. See BGB § 281(1) (Ger.); C.O. art. 107 (Switz.). In certain cases this does not apply, such
as where “the obligor seriously and definitely refuses to perform or if there are special
circumstances which . . . justify the immediate assertion of a claim for compensation.” BGB §
281(2) (Ger.); see also C.O. art. 108 (Switz.).
131. See BGB § 323 (Ger.).
132. See C.c. art. 1123 (Italy); BGB § 254 (Ger.); see also Whincup, op. cit., 266-71.
133. C.O art 44 (Switz.); see also ABGB § 1304 (Aus.).
134. Tallon, op. cit., 293; see Nicholas, op. cit., 23.
135. Hartkamp & Tillema, “Netherlands,” Transnational Litigation ¶ 212.
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136. See, e.g. B.W. art. 6:96 (Neth.).
137. See Treitel, op. cit., § 147.
138. See Final Award in Case No. 8423 of 1994, reprinted in 26 Y.B. Com. Arb. 153 (2001).
139. Ibid., 161.
140. Ibid., 165.
141. Ibid., 166.
142. See ibid.
143. See Waddams, op. cit., ¶ 1.90.
144. See ibid. ¶ 10.10; see also Sykes v. Midland Bank Executor & Trustee Co., [1971] 1 Q.B.
113 (C.A.).
145. See Melanson v. Wright (1896), 40 N.S.R. 598; Bowlay Logging Ltd. v. Domtar Ltd.
(1978), 87 D.L.R. (3d) 325 (B.C.S.C.); Hudson’s Bay Co. v. White, (1997), 32 C.C.L.T. (2d) 163
(Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)); Canadian Pacific Ltd. V. Lowe, (1998) 172 N.S.R. (2d) 89 (N.S.).
146. See, e.g., Whiten v. Pilot Insurance Co., [2002] 1 S.C.R. 595, 209 D.L.R. (4th) 257; Cornell
v. Pfizer C&G Inc., [1981] 23 C.P.C. 286 (Ont. H.C.); see also Haggart Construction Ltd. v.
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, [1998] 5 W.W.R. 586, 213 A.R. 241 (Q.B.); Royal Bank
of Canada v. W. Got & Associates Electric Ltd., [1999] 3 S.C.R. 408, 178 D.L.R. (4th) 385.
147. See Waddams, op. cit., ¶ 3.1320.
148. See, e.g., Jarvis v. Swan Tours Ltd., [1973] Q.B. 233 (C.A.) (upholding award for nonpecuniary damages, including mental distress and disappointment, suffered by family after its
travel agency cancelled its vacation package); Loder v. Triton Airlines Inc., (1994) 127 Nfld. &
P.E.I.R. 129 (Nfld. Prov. Ct.) (awarding non-pecuniary damages after breach of contract by an
airline); Newell v. Canadian Pacific Airlines, Ltd., (1976) 74 D.L.R. (3d) 574 (upholding non-
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pecuniary damages against an airline after the airline caused the death of a family’s dog);
Shillingford v. Dalbridge Group Inc., [1997] 3 W.W.R. 629 (B.C.C.A.) (awarding non-pecuniary
damages after money paid for the construction of a new home was misused).
149. See R.S.A. 2000 (Alberta Sale of Goods Act), c. S-2; R.S.B.C. 1996 (British Columbia Sale
of Goods Act); R.S.M. 1987 (Manitoba Sale of Goods Act); R.S.N.B. 1973 (New Brunswick
Sale of Goods Act); R.S.N.L. 1990 (Newfoundland and Labrador Sale of Goods Act);
R.S.N.W.T. 1988 (Northwest Territories’ Sale of Goods Act) (followed by the province of
Nunavut); R.S.N.S. 1989 (Nova Scotia Sale of Goods Act); R.S.O. 1990 (Ontario Sale of Goods
Act); R.S.P.E.I. 1988 (Prince Edward Island Sale of Goods Act); R.S.S. 1978 (Saskatchewan
Sale of Goods Act); R.S.Y. 2002 (Yukon Sale of Goods Act).
150. Compare British Columbia Sale of Goods Act, R.S.B.C. 1996 c. 410 s. 52(1)-(3)), with
Alberta Sale of Goods Act, R.S.A. 2000 c. S-2, s. 48(1)-(3)).
151. See, e.g., R.S.A. 2000 c. S-2, s. 49 (Alberta Sale of Goods Act).
152. See Victory Motors Ltd. v. Bayda, [1973] 3 W.W.R. 747 (Sask. Dist. Ct.).
153. See Consolidated Plate Glass Co. v. McKinnon Dash Co., (1917) 40 D.L.R. 47, 41 O.L.R.
188 (S.C.).
154. See, e.g., ibid.; R.S.O. 1990 c. S-1, s. 49 (Ontario Sale of Goods Act).
155. See, e.g., R.S.A. 2000 c. S-2, s. 50 (Alberta Sale of Goods Act); R.S.O. 1990 c. S-1, s. 50
(Ontario Sale of Goods Act).
156. See, e.g., R.S.A. 2000 c. S-2, s. 50; R.S.O. 1990 c. S-1, s. 50 (Ontario Sale of Goods Act).
157. See Waddams, op. cit., ¶ 14.20.
158. See Munroe Equipment Sales Ltd. v. Canadian Forest Products Ltd., (1961) 29 D.L.R. (2d)
730 (Man. C.A.).
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159. See H. Parsons (Livestock) Ltd. v. Uttley Ingham & Co. Ltd., [1978] Q.B. 791.
160. See Munroe Equipment Sales Ltd. v. Canadian Forest Products Ltd., (1961) 29 D.L.R. (2d)
730 (Man. C.A.).
161. See, e.g., Haack v. Martin, [1927] S.C.R. 413; Ticketnet Corp. v. Air Canada, (1997) 154
D.L.R. (4th) 271, 105 O.A.C. 87 (C.A.).
162. 100 Main Street East Ltd. v. W.B. Sullivan Construction Ltd., (1978) 88 D.L.R. (3d) 1, 22.
163. See Multi-Malls Inc. v. Tex-Mall Properties Ltd., (1980) 108 D.L.R. (3d), 399. In this case,
the plaintiff was awarded damages for the defendant’s breach of contract which prevented the
rezoning of the plaintiff’s property as a shopping mall. However, the chance of the re-zoning
occurring was only twenty percent before the breach occurred and therefore the plaintiff only
received twenty percent of the loss it claimed.
164. What is reasonable is a question of fact dependent upon the circumstances of a particular
case. See Benjamin v. Mosher, [1953] 1 D.L.R. 826 (N.S.S.C.).
165. See, e.g., Asamera Oil Corp. Ltd. v. Sea Oil & General Corp., [1979] S.C.R. 633, 89 D.L.R.
(3d) 1.
166. See, e.g., Pilkington v. Wood, [1953] Ch. 770; Lesters Leather & Skin Co. v. Home &
Overseas Brokers Ltd., (1948) 64 T.L.R. 569.
167. See Banco de Portugal v. Waterlow & Sons, Ltd., [1932] A.C. 452 (H.L); Kuzych v. White,
[1949] 4 D.L.R. 662 (B.C.S.C.).
168. One commentator explains:
Suppose the defendant agrees to supply goods for $10, the market price at the
time of due delivery is $12, and the defendant offers to supply the goods for $11
if the plaintiff will agree to a binding modification of the original contract. In
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these circumstances, it is submitted, the plaintiff would be liable for damages of
$2. It is not reasonable to expect the plaintiff to abandon contractual rights, and a
defendant who demands such an abandonment cannot complain of the plaintiff’s
refusal.
Waddams, op. cit., ¶ 15.210.
169. 84 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1089 (1998).
170. Ibid.
171. See ibid.
172. Specific performance is allowed to be granted by the court in cases where damages would
not adequately compensate the injured party. The seminal example is a contract for the sale of
land. See A. Corbin, 11 Corbin on Contracts § 993 (1993); Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§ 346.
173. See Corbin, op. cit., § 1002; Miller v. Robertson 266 U.S. 243 (1924).
174. See Corbin, op. cit., §§ 348 & 373 cmt. a.
175. See ibid., § 1001. Nominal damages are usually awarded as six cents or one dollar. See J.
Calamari & J. Perillo, The Law of Contracts § 14.2 (4th ed. 1998); see also Patel v. Howard
University, 896 F. Supp. 199 (D.D.C. 1995).
176. See Calamari & Perillo, op. cit., § 14.3; see also U.C.C. § 1-106(1); Restatement (Second)
of Torts §§ 355, 908 (1979).
177. See U.C.C. §§ 2-715, 2-721; see generally Dobbs, op. cit., § 12.1 et. seq.
178. R. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 64-7 (4th ed. 1999).
179. See ibid.
180. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 353.
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181. The general measure of damages for a complete breach of contract has been expressed as
follows:
Damages = loss in value + other loss – cost avoided – loss avoided
See Farnsworth, op. cit., 209. It should be noted that only the first two terms apply in the case of
a claim for partial breach. The above formula is not the only method for calculating damages.
One alternative method would give the claimant the sum of profit and other loss and the cost of
reliance less the loss avoided. See ibid. A third method allows the claimant to recover “for work
done, only such a proportion of the contract price as the fair cost of that work bore to the fair cost
of the whole work required, and, in respect of the work not done, only such profit, if any, as he
might have been made by doing it.” Kehoe v. Rutherford, 27 A. 912 (N.J. Sup. 1893).
182. See http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_summaries/uniformacts-s-ucc22003.asp;
http://www.nccusl.org/Update/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=0&tabid=11; www.ali.org.
183. See http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_summaries/uniformacts-s-ucc22003.asp; see
also L. Rusch, “Is the Saga of the Uniform Commercial Code Article 2 Revisions Over? A Brief
Look at What NCCUSL Finally Approved,” 6 Del. L. Rev., 41 (2003). In 1988, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law (NCCUSL) and the American Law
Institute decided to modernize Article 2 of the U.C.C., and numerous drafting committees
worked on a revised version for over ten years. On August 5, 2002, NCCUSL approved the
revised version of Article 2. The ALI approved the revised version on May 14, 2003. The
revised version has yet to be adopted by any state.
184. See Article 2 (original) Sales § 2-101 et. seq.; Article 2 (revised) Sales § 2-201 et. seq. See
also U.C.C. § 2-703 (setting forth seller’s remedies for breach); U.C.C. §§ 2-711, 2-714 (setting
for buyer’s remedies for breach).
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185. U.C.C. § 2-706.
186. U.C.C. § 2-708.
187. U.C.C. § 2-709. It further provides:
(2) Where the seller sues for the price he must hold for the buyer any goods which have been
identified to the contract and are still in his control except that if resale becomes possible he may
resell them at any time prior to the collection of the judgment. The net proceeds of any such resale
must be credited to the buyer and payment of the judgment entitles him to any goods not resold.
(3) After the buyer has wrongfully rejected or revoked acceptance of the goods or has failed to
make a payment due or has repudiated (Section 2-610 ), a seller who is held not entitled to the price
under this section shall nevertheless be awarded damages for non-acceptance under the preceding
section.
Ibid.
188. U.C.C. § 2-710.
189. U.C.C. § 2-711.
190. U.C.C. § 2-713.
191. U.C.C. § 2-714.
192. U.C.C. § 2-715.
193. Compare U.C.C. § 2-708(1) (original) Article Two (stating “the measure of damages for
non-acceptance or repudiation by the buyer is the difference between the market price at the time
and place for tender and the unpaid contract price together with any incidental damages provided
in this Article (Section 2-710))”, with U.C.C. § 2-708(1)(a)&(b) (revised) Article Two (stating
“the measure of damages for non-acceptance/repudiation by the buyer is the difference between
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the contract price and the market price . . . . together with any incidental or consequential
damages provided in this Article (§ 2-710)”).
194. Compare U.C.C. § 2-712 (original) Article Two stating:
(1) After a breach within the preceding section the buyer may “cover” by making
in good faith and without unreasonable delay any reasonable purchase of or
contract to purchase goods in substitute for those due from the seller.
(2) The buyer may recover from the seller as damages the difference between the
cost of cover and the contract price together with any incidental or consequential
damages as hereinafter defined (Section 2-715), but less expenses saved in
consequence of the seller’s breach.
(3) Failure of the buyer to effect cover within this section does not bar him from
any other remedy.
With U.C.C. § 2-712 (revised) Article Two stating:
(1) If the seller wrongfully fails to deliver or repudiates or the buyer rightfully
rejects or justifiably revokes acceptance, the buyer may “cover” by making in
good faith and without unreasonable delay any reasonable purchase of or contract
to purchase goods in substitution for those due from the seller.
(2) A buyer may recover from the seller as damages the difference between the
cost of cover and the contract price together with any incidental or consequential
damages under Section 2-715, but less expenses saved in consequence of the
seller’s breach.
(3) Failure of the buyer to effect cover within this section does not bar the buyer
from any other remedy.
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195. Compare U.C.C. § 2-713(1)(b) (revised), with U.C.C. § 2-713(1) (original) Article Two
stating: “(1) Subject to the provisions of this Article with respect to proof of market price
(Section 2-723), the measure of damages for non-delivery or repudiation by the seller is the
difference between the market price at the time when the buyer learned of the breach and the
contract price. . . .”
196. See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Firemen’s Charitable Assn., 9 So. 486 (La. 1891).
197. Corbin, op. cit., § 1006.
198. See Farnsworth, op. cit., 256.
199. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 351.
200. Ibid.
201. See Spang Indus. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 512 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1975).
202. See U.C.C. §§ 2-714(1) & 2-715(2)(a).
203. U.C.C. § 2-714(1).
204. U.C.C. § 2-715(2).
205. See Kirkland & Co. v. A & M Food Service, Inc., 579 So. 2d 1278 (Ala. 1991); Maggio,
Inc. v. United Farm Workers, 227 Cal. App. 3d 847, 278 Cal. Rptr. 250 (1991); AGF, Inc. v.
Great Lakes Heat Treating Co., 51 Ohio St. 3d 177, 555 N.E. 2d 634 (1990); South Carolina
Federal Savings Bank v. Thornton-Crosby Development Co., 303 S.C. 74, 399 S.E.2d 228 (S.C.
App. 1990); Mclain v. Kimbrough Construction Co., 806 S.W.2d 194 (Tenn. App. 1990);
Kerrville HRH v. City of Kerrville, 803 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. App. 1990); Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, § 352.
206. See Bagwell Coating v. Middle S. Energy, 797 F.2d 1298 (5th Cir. 1986); Locke v. United
States, 283 F.2d 521 (Ct. Cl. 1960); Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 403 A.2d 902 (N.J. 1979).
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207. See UCC § 1-106, cmt. 1 (providing that damages need not “be calculable with
mathematical accuracy”).
208. See Dunn, op. cit.
209. See R. I. Abrams, D. Welsch, & B. Jonas, “Stillborn Enterprises: Calculating Expectation
Damages Using Forensic Evidence,” 57 Ohio St. L. J. 809 (1996).
210. Farnsworth, op. cit., 267.
211. See Sol-O-Lite Laminating Corp. v. Allen, 353 P.2d 843 (Or. 1960); Stott v. Johnson, 299
P.2d 348 (Cal. 1951).
212. See Shiffer v. Board of Educ., 224 N.W.2d 255 (Mich. 1974); C. J. Goetz & R. E. Scott,
“The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation,” 69 Va. L. Rev.
967, 969 (1983).
213. See Treitel, op. cit., 53; see also McGregor, op. cit., § 218 (discussing cases).
214. See Carnation Co. v. Olivet Egg Ranch, 299 Cal. Rptr. 261 (Ct. App. 1986); see also
U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a).
215. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 350(1).
216. See Final Award in Case No. 8362 of 1995, reprinted in 22 Y.B. Com. Arb., 164 (1997).
217. Ibid.
218. Ibid.
219. See ibid., 177.
220. See C. Civ. art. 2104 (Mex.) (translated by A. Eckstein & E. Trujillo in Mexican Civil
Code (1996); Civ. C. art. 519 (Arg.) (translated by F. L. Joannini in The Argentinean Civil Code
(1917); Civ. C. art. 402 (Braz.); see also General Secretariat, Organization of American States, A
Statement of the Laws of El Salvador In Matters Affecting Business 52 (1970); University of
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Panama School of Law and Political Science, A Statement of the Laws of Panama in Matters
Affecting Business 53 (1974); P. Neto, 1 Doing Business in Brazil § 8.166 (2003) (citing Civ. C.
art. 402 (Braz.)).
221. See Civ. C. art. 402 (Braz.).
222. See J. de Aguiar Dias, 2 Da Responsabilidade Civil 838 (8th ed. 1989).
223. See Civil Code art. 1556 (Chile); see also Civ. C. art. 403 (Braz.).
224. A. Garro, “Argentina,” International Encyclopedia of Laws, 1 Contracts ¶ 294 (1995).
225. See ibid., ¶ 298 (citing to C. Civ. art. 522) (Arg.).
226. See C. Civ. art. 522 (Arg.).
227. See Remedies for International Sellers of Goods (D. Campbell ed., 2002).
228. See P. Neto, Doing Business in Brazil, § 8.166 (2005); Civ. C. art. 389 (Braz.).
229. See Civ. C. art. 520 (Arg.); see also Garro, op. cit., ¶ 300.
230. See Garro, op. cit., ¶ 301 (citing cases). Professor Garro also notes that the requirement of
directness has been interpreted to include “those that are ‘natural’ or ‘ordinary,’ as opposed to
‘exceptional’ or ‘extraordinary.’” Ibid.
231. See Garro, op. cit., ¶ 300. Cases of dolo involve purposeful breaches of contract such as
where a respondent attempts to avoid its contractual obligations, or breaches a contract through
fraud or deceit. See ibid.; see also General Secretariat, OAS (Organization of American States) A
Statement of the Laws of El Salvador in Matters Affecting Business 52 (1970).
232. See C. Civ. art. 1150. (Chile). Chile follows the typical civil law pattern of limiting
damages to those which are foreseeable, except in cases of dolo. See Cruz, “Chile,” 1
International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law C-54-55 (1999).
233. See M. Vargas & J. Pereira Lira, “Brazil,” Transnational Law BRA-11 (1997).
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234. See Civil Code arts. 1645,1648 (Guat.).
235. See C. Civ. arts. 2116, 1916 (Mex.) (“Sentimental value shall not be considered in
determining the value and deterioration of an asset, unless it is proven that the party responsible
for its damage did so for the purpose of injuring the feelings of its owner.”).
236. See P. Neto, op. cit., § 8.162 (citing to Civ. C. art. 393 (Braz.)).
237. C. Civ. art. 2111 (Mex.); see also Cruz, op. cit., C-54; Dr. J. Gómez Padilla, A Statement of
the Laws of Guatemala in Matters Affecting Business 75 (3d ed. 1975).
238. Garro, op. cit., ¶ 292. Meanwhile, Argentine legal scholars distinguish the burden of proof
in breach of contract cases between contractual obligations calling for the obligor to achieve a
specific result (obligaciones de resultado), in which the failure to perform raises a presumption
that the respondent was at fault, in contrast to contracts where the contractual obligation involves
a duty of best efforts (obligaciones de medio), in which fault must be proven.
239. See R. Moreno Rodrigeuz-Alcala, M. Ruffinelli & Asociados, “Paraguay,” Remedies for
International Sellers of Goods 13 (2002).
240. See C. Civ. art. 2080 (Mex.); Civ. C. art. 509 (Arg.).
241. See K. Zweigert & H. Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law 309 (3rd ed. 1998); H. J.
Liebesny, Foreign Legal Systems: A Comparative Analysis 216-41 (4th ed. 1981).
242. See A. F. Kassim, “Kuwait,” 1 Yearbook of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law 254, 255 (E.
Cotran & C. Mallat eds., 1994). However, Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution stipulates that
Shari’a is the main source of legislation. In addition to Egypt, Kuwait, Iran, Jordan, and the
United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) have enacted civil codes that have generally followed the French
model. See Ibid.; R. Price, “United Arab Emirates,” 1 Yearbook of Islamic and Middle Eastern

107

Law 304 (E. Cotran & C. Mallat eds., 1994); H. Haddad, “Jordan,” 1 Yearbook of Islamic and
Middle Eastern Law 178 (E. Cotran & C. Mallat eds., 1994).
243. Zweigert & Kötz, op. cit., 184.
244. See Const. Principle 4 (Iran).
245. See A. Bin-Nun, The Law of the State of Israel (Daniel C. Furman ed. & Menachem
Eichelberg trans., 1990); U. Yadin, “Israel,” 1 International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law
79 (1973).
246. See generally N. Saleh, “Remedies for Breach of Contract Under Islamic and Arab Laws,”
4 Arab L. Q. 269 (1989); N. Saleh, “Shari’a Influence on Middle Eastern Contract Law in the
Next Twenty Years,” Arab Commercial Law: Principles and Perspectives 27 (W. M. Ballantyne
& H. L. Stovall eds., 2002).
247.

See Saleh, “Remedies for Breach of Contract Under Islamic and Arab Laws,” op. cit.,

285-86 (citing Civil Code of Kuwait [KCC] art. 284; Civil Code of Jordan [JCC] art. 355; United
Arab Emirates Civil Code of Transactions [ECCT] art. 380).
248. See Civil Code art. 221 (Egypt), reprinted in M. H. Davies, Business Law in Egypt 199
(1984); Saleh, “Remedies for Breach of Contract Under Islamic and Arab Laws,” op. cit., 285
(citing KCC art. 300.2 (Kuwait)); see also H. Al Sarraf, “Kuwait,” Transnational Litigation § 69
(1999); W. Ballantyne, Commercial Law in the Arab Middle East: The Gulf States 98 (1986).
249. Saleh, “Remedies for Breach of Contract Under Islamic and Arab Laws,” op. cit., 286
(citing JCC art. 363 (Jordan); ECCT 389 (U.A.E.)). In practice lost profits and moral damage
may be recovered as the courts may appoint an outside expert to determine the damage without
asking for a distinction between actual loss lost profits or moral prejudice. See Saleh, “Shari’a
Influence on Middle Eastern Contract Law in the Next Twenty Years,” op. cit., 36-37.
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250. Saleh, “Remedies for Breach of Contract Under Islamic and Arab Laws,” op. cit., 280-281.
251. See ibid., 275. The buyer can also seek to have the price reduced according to the
diminished value of the goods.
252. See ibid. If buyers choose to keep the goods they do not have the remedy, as in Kuwait, of
price reduction.
253. See Civil Code arts. 221, 222, 238 (Iran); see also M. A. Ansari-Pour, “Iran,” 8 Y.B. of
Islamic and Middle Eastern Law 281 (E. Contran & M. Lau eds., 2001-2002). Whether this
includes damages for delay is unclear. However, the Shari’a in general does not allow recovery
of damages for delayed performance. See Saleh, “Remedies for Breach of Contract Under
Islamic and Arab Laws,” op. cit., 280.
254. See Saleh, “Shari’a Influence on Middle Eastern Contract Law in the Next Twenty Years,”
op. cit., 37, §§ 2-3; G. Shalev, “Israel,” International Encyclopaedia of Laws 5 Contracts, ¶ 101
(Dr. J. Herbots ed., 2000); D. Friedmann, “Remedies for Breach of Contract,” 1 Tel Aviv
University Studies in Law 170, 171 (1975).
255. Shalev, op. cit., ¶ 101; CA 1846/92 Levy v. Mabat Building Ltd., [1993] Isr. L.R. 111, 5
(citation omitted).
256.

See Contracts Law (Remedies for Breach of Contract) 5731-1970, § 10 (Isr.) [“Remedies

Law”].
257. See ibid., § 1(a).
258. See CA 1846/92 Levy v. Mabat Building Ltd., [1993] Isr. L.R 111, 5-6. In Israel, the
claimant can only recover on the basis of either the expectation interest or the reliance interest.
See Shalev, op. cit., ¶ 414. This is the case only if the party seeks compensation as the sole
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damages. See ibid.
259. See CA 1846/92 Levy v. Mabat Building Ltd., [1993] Isr L.R.111, 5 (citation omitted), 6
(citing FH 20/ 82 Adders Building Materials Ltd. v. Harlow and Jones GMBH [3], 268-269)
260. See Remedies Law, op. cit., § 13, which states: “[w]here the breach of contract has caused
other than pecuniary damage, the court may award compensation for that damage at the rate it
deems appropriate in the circumstances of the case.”
261. See Saleh, “Remedies for Breach of Contract Under Islamic and Arab Laws,” op. cit., 285
(citing civil code art. 300.2 (Kuwait)); Civil code art. 300.2 (Kuwait) (defining a natural
consequence as “damage the debtor could not have prevented by reasonable diligence”).
262. However, if the breaching party has committed serious fault or fraud it may be held liable
for direct damages whether the damages were foreseeable or not. See Saleh, “Remedies for
Breach of Contract Under Islamic and Arab Laws,” op. cit., 285 (citing civil code art. 300.3
(Kuwait)).
263. See Civ. C. art. 221 (Egypt).
264. See Award of 7 July 1985, case no. 1/1984, reprinted in Arbitral Awards of the Cairo
Regional Centre for International Commercial Arbitration 3-6 (2000).
265. Civ. C. art. 221 (Egypt).
266. Award of 7 July 1985, case no. 1/1984, op. cit., 5.
267. See Remedies Law (Isr.), op. cit., § 10.
268. See Kassim, op. cit., 261.
269. See Civil Code art. 227 (Iran).
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270. See J. Muhammed Mahmoud, “The Shari’a and its Relevance to Modern Transnational
Transactions,” 1 Arab Comparative & Commercial Law the International Approach 43-57
(1987).
271. See Friedmann, op. cit., 171.
272. See Civ C. art 157 (Egypt). The party must also be authorized to set a period for
performance.
273. See Civil Code art. 226 (Iran).
274. See Saleh, “Remedies for Breach of Contract Under Islamic and Arab Laws,” op. cit., 28081.
275. See Civil Code art. 301 (Kuwait).
276. See Anisimov v. Malon Tirat Bat-Sheva (1981) PD 35(2) 800, 806.
277. See Remedies Law (Isr.), op. cit., § 13; see also E. Livneh, “Factors Determining the
Amount of Damages,” 4 Israel L. Rev. 177 (1969).
278. See Civ. C. art. 216 (Egypt).
279. See Case no. 2 Award of 4 June 1990, case no. 12/1989, reprinted in Arbitral Awards of the
Cairo Regional Centre for International Commercial Arbitration 7-11 (2000).
280. Ibid., 9. The applicable law was from the Egyptian Civil Code articles 221 and 216, which
states:
The Judge will fix the amount of damages, if they have not been fixed in the
contract or by law. The amount of damages includes losses suffered by the creditor
and profits of which he has been deprived, provided that they are the normal result
of the failure to perform the obligation or of delay in such performance. These
losses shall be considered to be a normal result if the creditor is not able to avoid
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them after attempting to do so. When however, the obligation arises from contract,
a debtor who has not been guilty of fraud or gross negligence will not be held liable
for damages greater than those which could have normally been foreseen at the
time of contract. The Judge may reduce the amount of damages or may even refuse
to allow damages if the creditor by his own fault, has contributed to the cause of
loss or increased it.
The Tribunal did find, however, that the Claimant could recover administrative and other
expenses paid out in reliance on the contract. See ibid., 9.
281. Remedies Law (Isr.), op. cit.
282. The common law of contracts has been codified in India in the Indian Contract Act, 1872
and, with regard to the sale of goods, in the Sale of Goods Act, 130. See generally I. Basu
Majumdar & S. Jha, “The Law Relating to Damages under International Sales: A Comparative
Overview Between the CISG and Indian Contract Law,” 5 Vindobona J. Int’l Com. L. & Arb.
185 (2001).
283. See 9 Halsbury’s Laws of India, § 115.132 (2001); V. Ramachandran, 2 The Law of
Contract in India: A Comparative Study 1572 (1971); see also Ghaziabad Development
Authority v. Union of India [2000] 2 L.R.I. 995, 6 S.C.C. 113.
284. See Ramachandran, op. cit., 1588.
285. See ibid.; Halsbury’s Laws of India, op. cit., § 115.138. In contrast to English and
American common law, the extent to which nominal damages are still awarded in India is based
on the facts and circumstances of the case. Ibid. (citing Brahmdeo Narain Singh v. Members of
the Notified Area Committee A.I.R. 1965 Pat 179, ¶¶ 10, 11 (1965) B.L.J.R. 679; relying on
Yarlagadda China Rattayya v. Donepudi Venkataramayya AIR 1959 A.P. 551; Rolin v. Steward,

112

(1854) 14 C.B. 595, 139 E.R. 245; Wilson v. United Countries Bank Ltd., [1920] A.C. 102
(H.L.).
286. See Ghaziabad Development Authority v. Union of India (2000) 6 S.C.C. 113, 117 (citing 1
Chitty on Contracts ¶ 26.041 (27th ed. 1977)).
287. The time for calculation of damages is the day of the breach. Although the seller cannot
recover more if the market continues to drop, the buyer is also not barred from recovering an
increase in damages if the market rises. A. Dutt, Dutt on Contract: the Indian Contract Act, §
73, at 555 (1990).
288. See Halsbury’s Laws of India, op. cit., § 115.154; Ramachandran, op. cit., §73, at 1589. If
there is no market at the place for delivery, damages can be based on the nearest substitute, or the
purchase value of the goods. Ibid.
289. See § 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, which states:
[w]hen a contract has been broken, the party who suffers by such breach is entitled to receive,
from the party who has broken the contract, compensation for any loss or damage caused to him
thereby, which naturally arose in the usual course of things from such breach, or which the parties
knew, when they made the contract, to be likely to result from the breach of it. Such
compensation is not to be given for any remote and indirect loss or damage sustained by reason of
the breach.
290. See Ramachandran, op. cit., § 73, at 1576 (citing British Columbia Sawmill Co. v.
Nettleship, (1868) L.R. 3 CP 499, 509).
291. A.I.R. 1952 Nag 32, discussed in Ramachandran, op. cit., § 73, at 1576.
292. See ibid.
293. See Halsbury’s Laws of India, op. cit., §§ 115.137, 115.140.
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294. See Dutt, op. cit., 551.
295. M. Lachia Setty & Sons Ltd. v. Coffee Board, Bangalore A.I.R. 1981 SC 162.
296. See Final Award in Case No. 8445 of 1996, reprinted in 26 Y.B. Com. Arb., 167 (2001).
297. Ibid., 175.
298. Ibid.
299. Ibid. (citing State of Kerala v. K. Bhaskaran, [1985] AIR Kerala 55).
300. See Final Award in Case No. 8445 of 1996, op. cit., 175-76. The award of lost profits was
adjusted to present value and interestingly discounted 15% to take into account the “uncertain
nature of the calculations.” Ibid.
301. See ibid., 177.
302. See Civil Code art. 389(1) (S. Korea).
303. See Civil Code art. 389 (1) (S. Korea); MinpÇ art. 414(1) (Civil Code of Japan).
304. See Uniform Contract Law of China, 1999 [U.C.L.] art. 110.
305. See B.Chung & K. Suk, “Korea,” Transnational Litigation, KOR-59 (2000); Doing
Business in Japan, § 1.15 [d] (Z. Kitagawa ed., 2004).
306. See Doing Business in Japan, op. cit., § 1.15 [3][f][I] (citing Kasuya K.K. v. YuryÇ SatÇ
HaikyãkÇdan, Supreme Court, 11 Minshã 960, June 7, 1957).
307. See Civil Code art. 416 (S. Korea).
308. Ibid.
309. See H. Oda, Japanese Law, 175 (2d ed. 1999); Doing Business in Japan, op. cit., §
1.15[e][i].
310. The new Contract Law of China (UCL) was enacted by the National Peoples’ Congress of
the People’s Republic of China on March 15, 1999. It replaced the old division of contract law
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in China which broke contract law into the Economic Contract Law, Foreign Economic Contract
Law, and the Technology Contract Law, all of which were revoked on the same day the U.C.L.
was passed.
311. See U.C.L. art. 113 (China). In a break from the traditional civil law, damages are the
primary remedy, although specific performance is still an available remedy under certain
conditions. See U.C.L. art. 112 (China). Punitive damages can also be recovered under U.C.L.
art. 114 (China).
312. See F. Chen, “The New Era of Chinese Contract Law: History Development and
Comparative Analysis,” 27 Brook. J. IntLLl L. 153, 187 (2001-2002); K. Wang, Chinese
Commercial Law 50-82 (2000); see also D. Zeller, Damages under the Convention on the
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 11 (2005).
313. See Chen, op. cit., 190; Wang, op. cit.
314. See Civil Code art. 419(2) (S. Korea); MinpÇ art. 397(2) (Japan).
315. See Civil Code art. 419(2) (S. Korea); MinpÇ art. 397(2) (Japan). For example, obligors
cannot use force majeure to escape a monetary debt.
316. See Doing Business in Japan, op. cit., 67.
317. See Doing Business in Japan, op. cit., 65, 68, 85.
318. See U.C.L. arts. 111-113.
319. See ibid. Price reduction is a common remedy throughout civil law countries, and is
reflected in the Convention on the International Sale of Goods, article 50.
320. See Civil Code art. 416(2) (S. Korea); MinpÇ art. 393 (Japan); U.C.L. art. 113 (China).
321. See, e.g., Civil Code art. 418 (S. Korea); see also Civil Code arts. 415-416 (S. Korea).
322. See U.C.L. art. 119 (China).
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323. See Doing Business in Japan, op. cit., § 1.15 [e][i]. The Japanese concept of adequate
causation actually follows the English law rule laid out in Hadley v. Baxendale. While it draws
on the distinction between natural damages and damages resulting from special circumstances, it
has been interpreted to be similar to German law. See ibid; see also Oda, op. cit., 175; Doing
Business in Japan, op. cit., 56-59.
324. See Civil Code art. 416 (S. Korea); MinpÇ art. 393 (Japan).
325. Civil Code art. 416(2) (S. Korea); see also MinpÇ art. 393(2) (Japan).
326. See Sang-Hyun Song, Korean Law in the Global Community 1179 (1996).
327. See Oda, op. cit., 175 (citing Judgment of the Supreme Court, Apr. 28, 1961 (Minshã 15-41105)).
328. See Oda, op. cit., 175 (citing Judgment of the Supreme Court, Dec. 18, 1953 (Minshã 7-121446)).
329. See Oda, op. cit., 175 (citing Judgment of the Supreme Tribunal, Apr. 5, 1929 (Minshã 8373)).
330. See U.C.L. art. 113 (China).
331. See Civil Code art. 415 (S. Korea).
332. See Oda, op. cit., 170-71.
333. See Civil Code art. 419 (S. Korea); MinpÇ art. 397 (Japan).
334. Civil Code art. 418 (S. Korea); see also MinpÇ art. 396 (Japan).
335. See Oda, op. cit., 176; Doing Business in Japan, op. cit., 80.
336. See UCL art. 114 (China).
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337. Australian courts are not bound by English precedent, but English decisions are accorded
great weight. See Zweigert & Kötz, op. cit., 229. In some instances, such as the English Sale of
Goods Act, 1893, Australia has adopted English legislation word for word. See ibid. at 230.
338. See M. Chetwin & S. Graw, An Introduction to the Law of Contract in New Zealand §
15.2.1 (3d ed. 2001). Specific performance may be granted when damages would not adequately
compensate the injured party for their loss. See ibid.
339. See ibid. at §15.2.2; J. Carter, “Australia,” International Encyclopaedia of Laws 1
Contracts ¶ 210 (Dr. J. Herbots ed., 1994); see also McElroy Milne v. Commercial Electronics
Ltd., [1993] 1 N.Z.L.R. 39 (CA).
340. See Chetwin & Graw, op. cit., § 15.2.4.
341. See TC Indus. Plant Pty. Ltd. v. Robert’s Queensland Pty. Ltd., (1963) 180 C.L.R. 130,
141-42.
342. See D. Khoury & Y. Yamouni, Understanding Contract Law 286 (3d ed. 1992).
343. See Carter, op. cit., ¶ 209.
344. See Bloxham v. Robinson [1996] 2 N.Z.L.R. 664 (finding emotional damage not
compensable in breach of contract to sell half interest in dental practice); Khoury & Yamouni,
op. cit., 288.
345. See Rowlands v. Collow [1992] N.Z.L.R. 178 (H.C. Wellington); Jarvis v. Swans Tours
Ltd., [1972] 3 W.L.R. 954, 958 (finding the claimant could recover damages for “the
disappointment, the distress, upset and frustration caused by the breach” resulting from a holiday
which went badly) (discussed in Khoury & Yamouni, op. cit., 287).
346. See Carter, op. cit., ¶¶ 211-214,
347. For New Zealand, see Sale of Goods Act, 1908; in Australia, see Sale of Goods Act, 1954.
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348. See Sale of Goods Act 1908 (N.Z.) § 50(1) (providing a seller an action for the price when
the buyer received the goods); § 51(3) (damages are the difference between the contract price
and market price); § 52(3) (same for the buyer). Contract Remedies are also regulated by the
Contractual Remedies Act of 1979, which expressly states the Act does not affect the Sale of
Goods Act. See ibid, § 15 (d).
349. See Carter, op. cit., ¶ 192; Sale of Goods Act, 1895, §§ 37, 49, 53.
350. See Sale of Goods Act 1908 § 52(3) (N.Z.); Sale of Goods Act 1954 § 54 (Austl.).
351. See Sutton, Sales Law, op. cit., 441. If, however, the market price has risen the buyer may
not be able to show any actual loss.
352. See Sale of Goods Act, 1954, §§ 54, 56, 57 (Austl.).
353. See Sale of Goods Act, 1954 § 55 (Austl.).
354. See Alexander v. Cambridge Credit Corp. (1987) 9 N.S.W.L.R. 310, 315, 350-51; March v.
Stramare (1991) 171 C.L.R. 506.
355. See Carter, op. cit., ¶ 218. There may also be other intervening factors which break the
causal chain, however, these might also be foreseeable results of the breach and therefore would
not sever liability. See Monarch SS Co Ltd. v. A/B Karlshamns Oliefabriker, [1949] A.C. 196.
356. [1993] 1 N.Z.L.R. 39, 45 (CA).
357. Ibid., 43.
358. See ibid.
359. See Chetwin & Graw, op. cit., § 15.3.2.
360. See Isaac Naylor & Sons Ltd. v. NZ Co-op Wool Marketing Assn Ltd., [1981] 1 N.Z.L.R.
361. See McElroy Milne v. Commercial Electronics Ltd., [1993] 1 N.Z.L.R. 39, 45 (CA).

118

362. See Alexander v. Cambridge Credit Corp., (1987) 9 N.S.W.L.R. 310, 365-366; see also
Carter, op. cit., ¶ 219.
363. See J. Carter & D. Harland, Contract Law in Australia, ¶ 2117 (14th Ed. 2002).
364. See Newbrook v. Marshall, [2002] 2 N.Z.L.R. 606 (CA), summarized in pertinent part in A.
Beck, “Contract,” 2003 N.Z.L.R. 121, 137.
365. Ibid.
366. If claimants provide no evidence concerning their loss or damage, courts will often limit
recovery to a nominal sum. See Carter & Harland, op. cit., ¶ 2117, at 775; McGregor, op. cit., §
260; Beck, op. cit., 96.
367. See Fink v. Fink [1946] C.L.R. 127, 143; Carter, op. cit., ¶ 215.
368. See Carter & Harland, op. cit., ¶ 2133, at 785.
369. See J & B Caldwell Ltd. v. Logan House Retirement Home Ltd., [1999] 2 N.Z.L.R. 99
(H.C. Auck.); TCN Channel 9 Pty. v. Haden Enterprises Pty. Ltd., [1989] 16 N.S.W.L.R. 130,
162. Commentators point out that “the prima facie rules in the sale of goods contracts, which
rely on a comparison of market price and contract price, assume that the plaintiff will (or
should) mitigate loss by going into the market.” Carter & Harland, op. cit., ¶ 2137, at 789.
370. See Sutton, op. cit., 442; Simonius Vischer & Co. v. Holt, [1979] N.S.W.L.R. 322, 355-56.
371. McGregor, op. cit., § 218; see also Carter & Harland, op. cit., ¶ 2137, at 789; Sutton, op.
cit., 443 (citing Varga v. Stokes Seeds Ltd., (1962) 32 D.L.R. (2d) 167) (stating reasonable
mitigation may include such things as selling the crop sown from inferior seed)); McKenny v.
Drummond Dvoretsky, (1926) 29 W.A.L.R. 6.
372. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, art. 1, U.N.
Doc. A/Conf.97/18 Annex I (1980) [hereinafter CISG]. For a discussion of the CISG, see F.
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Enderlein & D. Maskow, International Sales Law: United Nations Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods (1992); J. Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales Under
the 1980 United Nations Convention (2d ed. 1990); The Convention for the International Sale of
Goods: A Handbook of Basic Materials. (R. R. Kathrein & D. B. Magraw eds., 1987). For a list
of contracting States, see http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/countries/cntries.html.
373. See CISG arts. 45, 61. While articles 74 through 77 set forth the rules concerning damages,
numerous other articles can affect the right to or calculation of damages. See CISG arts. 6, 7, 8,
9, 66, 80, 85, 86, 87, 88.
374. See H. M. Flechtner, “Remedies Under the New International Sales Convention: The
Perspective From Article 2 of the U.C.C.,” 8 J.L. COM. 53, 59 (1988), available at
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/flecht.html.
375. For a detailed discussion of the CISG, see F. Enderlein & D. Maskow, op. cit.; J. Honnold,
op. cit.; A. H. Kritzer, Guide to Practical Applications of the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (1989).
376. CISG art. 74.
377. See CISG art. 74.
378. Ibid.
379. Secretariat Commentary, ¶ 3, in “Guide to CISG art. 74,” available at
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/secomm/secomm-74.html.
380. Ibid., ¶ 5.
381. CISG art. 75.
382. Ibid.
383. Ibid.
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384. CISG art. 76(1).
385. CISG art. 76(2).
386. See P. Schlectriem, Uniform Sales Law - The UN Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods 97 (1986).
387. See Enderlein & Maskow, op. cit., 298.
388. See CISG art. 5 (“This convention does not apply to the liability of the seller for death or
personal injury caused by the goods to any person.”).
389. See Enderlein & Maskow, op. cit., 300.
390. See J. Lookofsy, “Fault and No-Fault in Danish, American and International Sales Law:
The Reception of the United Nations Convention, 27 Scandinavian Studies in Law 109, 129-30
(1983), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/lookofsky4.html.
391. It should be noted that commentators have asserted that the Convention imposes upon a
claimant the burden of providing evidence of damages. See Enderlein & Maskow, op. cit., 298.
However, the Convention does not expressly require that damages be proved with certainty. See
D. Saidov, “Methods of Limiting Damages under the Vienna Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods,” § 5 (2001), available at
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/saidov.html.
392. See Delchi Carrier, SpA v. Rotorex Corp, 71 F.3d 1024 (2d Cir. 1995) (U.S.); 20 Feb.
1997 (Switz.), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970220s1.html ; ICC Arbitration
Case No. 8611, 23 Jan. 1997, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/978611i1.html.
393. See Oberlandesgericht Köln, 21 May 1996 (Ger.), available at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960521g1.html; ICC Arbitration Case No. 9187, June 1999,
available at http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/urteile/705.htm.
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394. See Appellate Court Celle, 2 Sept. 1998 (Ger.), available at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/980902g1.html http://cisg3.law.pace.edu/cases/980902g1.html
(requiring exact calculation of damages); District Court München, 20 Feb. 2002 (Ger.), available
at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020220g1.html (requiring specific ascertainment of
damages).
395. See District Court Kuopio, 5 Nov. 1996 (Fin.), available at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/961105f5.html (reasonable standard); CIETAC Arbitration
Proceeding, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/900000c1.html (reasonable proof).
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397. See Enderlein & Maskow, op. cit., 300.
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400. See L. Chengwei, “Remedies for Non-performance: Perspectives from CISG, UNIDROIT
Principles and PECL,” § 14.2.5 (Sept. 2003), available at
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401. Enderlein & Maskow, op. cit., 301.
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Kritzer, op. cit., 479; J. Ziegel, “Parker School Text,” in Kritzer, op. cit., 9-38. But see E.
Farnsworth, 27 Am J. Comp. L., 253 (1979).
405. Kritzer, op. cit., 494.
406. Secretariat Commentary, op. cit., art. 77, ¶ 4.
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Proposal, see Honnold, op. cit., 520-22. See also Final Award in Case No. 8817 of 1997,
reprinted in 25 Y.B. Com. Arb. 355, 367 (2000).
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414. Ibid., 1029 (quoting Honnold, op. cit., 503).
415. See Delchi Carriers, op. cit., 1031.
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(1995).
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420. See Banque Arabe et Internationale D’Investissement v. Inter-Arab Investment Guarantee
Corp., Award of 17 Nov. 1994, reprinted in 21 Y.B. Com. Arb. 13, 37 (1996); see also Sapphire
International Petroleum Ltd. v. National Iranian Oil Co., ad hoc award of 15 Mar. 1963, 35 Int’l
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